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Regional transportation plans describe comprehensive planning processes and 
visions, but long-range transportation planning is only one among many decision sites 
for transit investment. As most plans are only partially implemented, this research 
aims to illuminate the factors that determine which transit projects are implemented. It 
combines case study research (Miami, Orlando, and Boston), with quantitative 
analysis of federal transit funding. The work addresses three broad questions about 
metropolitan decision making and action: how does significant action happen across 
jurisdictions? What is the state and federal role in metropolitan governance? How does 
equity fare in implementation? In each of three papers, I start at a different 
government scale: metropolitan planning organization (MPO), state, and nation. 
The first paper describes critical decision making processes external to MPO 
planning. Case studies of Boston and Miami demonstrate that MPO planning 
responded to, rather than determined, transit implementation choices. Due to the 
influence of external decisions or bypasses, I argue federal directives for equity in 
regional transportation planning were insufficient to advance equity in Miami and 
Boston. Community mobilization in Boston was sustained and moderately successful; 
advocacy groups advanced two projects toward implementation. 
Next, I examine the sub-national state’s role in transit implementation, based 
 on projects proposed in Miami and Orlando. The Florida Department of 
Transportation adopted a leadership role for projects that had greater economic 
significance and regional consensus behind them. By selectively contributing capacity, 
―power to,‖ state actors exerted ―power over‖ regional outcomes in Orlando and 
Miami. 
The third paper presents a quantitative analysis of the federal New Starts 
program, which funds transit expansion. Local financial commitment most correlates 
with federal funding, according to statistical results. All funded projects met a 
minimum threshold of benefits. Yet, the Federal Transit Administration was not more 
likely to fund projects with higher benefits ratings.  
Findings suggest regionally significant action happens not simply nor easily 
through planning, but instead through established government entities and through the 
mobilization of capacity. Altshuler and Luberoff’s ―bottom-up‖ federalism is a useful 
concept to describe how powerful federal actors respond to and enable action at 
smaller scales. In this conceptual frame, local initiative and mobilization are pivotal, 
aligning with increasing interest in governance. At the same time, however, findings 
indicate the need to further develop governance as an analytic category that 
incorporates multiple types of power and spheres of action. In addition, this research 
shows that equity advocates can sometimes affect outcomes. Due to existing 
constraints for metropolitan planning organizations, the conclusion describes options 
to strengthen or alter their role. I conclude with reflections on the ideal rail deal. 
Political will behind infrastructure investment can be an opportunity to enable other 
critical environmental and equity interventions.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 
Orlando conjures up images of Walt Disney World and Floridian auto-oriented 
sprawl, but local elected officials, business leaders, and civic organizations have 
voiced support for a regional vision of contained growth and increased transit use. In 
fact, within a few years, metropolitan Orlando will have its first intrametropolitan rail 
service. The project has so much support that a republican county mayor and a 
democratic city mayor lobbied together in the state capital for it. The professional 
basketball team even promoted it during game-time announcements. However, the 
region has seen numerous failed rail attempts over the last twenty years, and its long-
range plan has contained other rail proposals. In this regard, the region is similar to 
others, where many of the rail investments in official plans have not materialized. This 
research explores what factors and government interventions lead to the 
implementation of some regional rail projects, while other projects fail to attract 
sufficient support and funding. 
 For many planners, support for alternatives to automobile-dependency 
translates into enthausism for transit expansions. Yet, the logic of this project could 
seem dubious to outside observes, even to planners promoting alternative 
transportation modes. The Federal Transit Administration‘s review shows the 
commuter rail costs more but delivers fewer benefits than many other projects seeking 
funds (FTA, 2008). The project does not do well on equity criteria. The project‘s 
riders will include a disproportionately low share of transit dependent riders, compared 
to the metropolitan population (FTA, 2008). Is this the best investment for federal 
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dollars? Or even the best investment within the region? 
Planning literature explains that rail investment decisions are not based solely 
on ―rational‖ criteria (Cohen-Blankshtain & Feitelson, 2010; Sager & Ravlum, 2005; 
Taylor, Kim, & Gahbauer, 2009), but what I found surprising about this project was its 
widespread support and connection to regional hopes. In interviews, stakeholders 
asserted the need for regional unity and dismissed the main critic of the commuter rail 
project as motivated by a personal vendetta. How then did regional support coalesce 
around this project and spur multi-sector action for implementation? Why initiate rail 
along this corridor, where density is not especially high? Why was this project likely 
to be implemented, whereas so many previous efforts had failed in the region? What 
relationship did this project‘s prioritization have to the official metropolitan 
transportation planning process? The battles to advance this project appeared to be 
happening at the state level, where the county and city mayors lobbied in support. A 
staunch, republican supporter sat on a key congressional committee in Washington, 
DC. What role did these levels of government have in the project‘s selection and 
implementation? These questions are applicable not only to Orlando‘s planned 
commuter rail, but to transit investment decision making and implementation across 
metropolitan areas. 
This research grew from an interest in the potential of federally mandated, 
long-range planning to encourage beneficial and equitable transportation investments 
within regions. However, early observations in Orlando, Miami and Boston 
demonstrated that the transit components of regional plans are far from fully 
implemented. Long-range planning is only one among many decision sites and 
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probably not the most important for implementation. Thus, this research explores the 
complex processes that result in actual implementation—or not. Given the partial 
implementation of plans, the empirical focus of this research is to understand the 
factors that determine which projects are implemented. I combine case study research 
from metropolitan Miami, Orlando, and Boston, with quantitative analysis of federal 
funding. I present results in three papers. Each paper begins analysis from a different 
level: the metropolitan planning organization (MPO), the (sub-national) state, and the 
Federal Transit Administration‘s funding. 
Situating the Research 
This empirical analysis contributes to broader questions on metropolitan 
decision making and action. As seen in the Orlando commuter rail example, rail 
implementation raises several broader questions: how does significant action happen 
across jurisdictions? What is the relationship among different tiers of government? 
How does equity fare in the implementation? These questions share a common thread 
of plan implementation, an area in need of further research (Laurian et al., 2004; 
Talen, 1996). In this introductory chapter, I discuss existing perspectives on these 
three questions, the topical area of research, and the three papers that follow.  
How Does Significant Actions Happen across Jurisdictions? 
Much of the discussion of metropolitan governance has been normative, 
describing how significant metropolitan action could or should happen. The first and 
second waves of United States-based regionalism built on the idea that local 
government boundaries should match the geographic reach of metropolitan areas. 
Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) suggest ideals for metropolitan government began with 
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the annexations and city-county consolidations of the 19
th
 century. Post-war 
metropolitan regionalism aimed more ambitiously to shape the spatial configuration of 
population and industry and had a greater connection to the federal arena (Brenner, 
2002). Local attempts to reorganize government regionally from 1950-1970, however, 
had limited success at restructuring formal government. Yet councils of government 
still formed in most metropolitan areas.  
After the limited success of regional reorganization, new regionalism (NR) 
emerged in the 1990s. It typically adopts a comprehensive approach with 
environmental, economic and equity goals (Wheeler, 2002). ―Social new regionalists‖ 
(Kipfer & Wirsig, 2004) argue for increased coordination based on the inequities of 
current metropolitan government arrangements and to some extent on environmental 
and economic concerns. Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004) argue that the 
current system of metropolitan fragmentation contributes to social inequities and 
sprawl, with negative effects for multiple constituents, especially for low-income 
residents. Like Orfield (1997), they identify the shared interests between central cities 
and inner-ring suburbs. Pastor, Dreier, Gribsby and López -Garza (2000) argue central 
city and suburban futures are tied, as are regional economic prosperity and decreasing 
poverty. Despite such multi-pronged approaches, Brenner (2002) claims economic 
development has become the most prominent rationale for regional coordination.  
New regionalists commonly seek to increase regional coordination and 
capacity through governance rather than a reorganization of government structure. 
Governance differs from government, because it includes private sector stakeholders, 
such as businesses and civic actors, and functions partly through informal and 
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cooperative methods of coordination. Some argue informal and collaborative 
governance is a more effective method for regionalism than a hierarchical approach, 
since informal arrangements provide flexible or innovative solutions for regional 
challenges (Hendriks, 2006; Salet, 2006). Governance can be a normative idea—that it 
is a desirable or effective strategy—or an analytic category, referring to urban political 
processes beyond formal government (Pierre, 2005). Savitch and Vogel‘s (2000) 
explanation of the term‘s use reflects at least some normative aspect: ―governance 
conveys the notion that existing institutions can be harnessed in new ways, that 
cooperation can be carried out on a fluid and voluntary basis among localities, and that 
people can best regulate themselves through horizontally linked organizations‖ (p. 
161, emphasis original). In governance discussions, horizontal refers to the 
intrametropolitan arena, often treated as a network of equal partners. Vertical refers to 
hierarchy, such as the local, state and federal relationship. 
Much of the new regionalism research has made the case for increased 
coordination, but recent empirical research demonstrates the limitations of the 
horizontal, cooperative governance ideal. Such recent research has more directly 
answered how regionally significant action happens. Here, I overview empirical 
studies that show equity goals require substantial mobilization, find business interests 
wield special influence, and demonstrate the limited impact of intraregional 
cooperation. These empirical studies demonstrate the need to take a more critical view 
of the assumptions behind capacity building and the cooperative model of multi-
jurisdictional governance.  
First, the equity aims of ―social new regionalists‖ have not materialized. 
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Orfield (1997) proposed central city and inner-ring suburban alliances would advance 
intrametropolitan equity, but such coalitions have failed to come to fruition 
(Swanstrom & Banks, 2009). In practice, new regionalism has often failed to prioritize 
environmental justice and equity (Rast, 2006; Scott, 2007), although Bollens (2003) 
observes that regional efforts have sometimes addressed disparities, frequently 
through state or federal programs. Pastor, Benner and Matsuoka (2009) describe great 
potential for community-based regionalism (CBR) to promote equity and regional 
problem solving. Swanstrom and Banks‘ (2009) describe instead the need for policy 
change, based on their analysis of community benefits agreements related to 
construction workforce development. Without policy change, they conclude ―local 
hiring agreements…will depend on extraordinarily entrepreneurial CBOs [community 
based organizations]. Without vertical relations that empower CBOs in regional 
governance networks, CBR will falter‖ (p. 364). Thus, the equity goals articulated by 
new regionalists are highly contingent on local capacity.  
Second, case studies that document a central role for business suggest 
imbalanced influence in horizontal relationships. For example, Alpert, Gainsborough 
and Wallis‘ (2006) network analysis shows that business actors, the regional planning 
agency, and county and municipal governments were all important nodes of 
connection to other stakeholders in a transportation reform effort. Business 
organizations, however, were the critical policy entrepreneurs. Gainsborough (2003) 
concludes from her case studies of Houston and Los Angeles that business actors may 
promote regionalism to enhance place-based economic well-being. Business-led 
regionalism may often support center cities, but ―this vision of center city health 
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embedded in regionalism is likely to reflect the traditional biases of business-centered 
urban policy‖ (p. 555). In a study of Los Angeles and Chicago, Weir, Rongerude and 
Ansell (2009) found that LA‘s sustainability groups working on transportation lacked 
power. On the other hand, regional institutional reform was possible in Chicago, 
because business organizations engaged in transportation issues and wielded power in 
the state legislature. The need for connection to vertical power may limit the ability of 
less powerful players to make impact through regional coordination. Business actors 
in these studies are disproportionately influential in and critical for significant action. 
Finally, research demonstrates that informal and semi-formal cooperative 
mechanisms have limited impact while, formal government is still pivotal for action. 
Actualizing partnerships is challenging (Innes & Gruber, 2005; Visser, 2004) and 
government remains a critical player (Scott, 2007). Weir, Rongerude and Ansell 
(2009) explain simply enough through their title that ―collaboration is not enough,‖ 
despite its appeal. Studies on the role of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) 
supplement these NR case studies, as researchers have found that envisioned, MPO-
led collaborations have largely not materialized (Goldman & Deakin, 2000; Innes & 
Gruber, 2005). In one example, federal policies for regional coordination facilitated ―a 
consensus plan to build two bridges…However, the MPO process did not lead to the 
development of a metropolitan-wide interest or perspective‖ (Vogel and Nezelkewicz, 
2002, p. 107).  
In addition to case studies that show the complexities of governance, NR 
literature could benefit from urban regime debates. Like urban regime theory, new 
regionalism—as a normative or analytic concept—emphasizes the need to build 
 8 
 
capacity to take significant action across sectors. In other words, both urban regime 
and NR literature examine how sufficient capacity for action is mobilized, ―recognize 
the role of non-government actors‖ (Hamilton, 2004, p. 457), and emphasize informal 
means for building collaboration around shared interests. Stone, who popularized 
urban regime theory, adopts a ―social production‖ model of power (1989, 2006). In his 
social production model, power is assembling the capacities necessary to take 
significant action. In the United States, where the theory originates, the local state 
lacks sufficient resources to govern and thus enters into coalitions with other players 
through a regime or a ―set of arrangements whereby this division of labour is 
combined. This is achieved not through formal hierarchies but by networking in which 
actors co-operate because they recognize their mutual dependency‖ (Thornely, Rydin, 
Scalon, & West, 2005, p. 1950).  
Critiques of urban regime theory, or urban governance more broadly, may also 
apply to new regionalism. Mossberger and Stoker (2001) assert that urban regime 
theory links to political economic context in its recognition that regimes depend on 
business participation. Nonetheless, Imbroscio (2003) and Davies (2002) criticize 
urban regime analyses‘ disconnect from economic structures. The focus on shared 
capacity that some regime literature presents can obscure the unequal power between 
local actors and potential fundamental conflicts of interest (Gendron & Domhoff, 
2009). Likewise, discussions of governance more broadly have neglected conflict 
(Davies, 2005; Minnery, 2007). New regionalism has touched on the influence of 
business and other actors in case studies, described above, but has not developed a 
framework for understanding differential power and conflict. 
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In sum, much of the new regionalism literature has articulated the need for and 
potential mechanisms of regional action—that regional action should happen. Some 
empirical case studies have shown the complications of regional efforts in practice. 
NR has promoted a cooperative, cross-sector model of governance to build capacity 
for regional action to address issues from inequities to enhanced regional 
competitiveness. Insightful case study research has demonstrated that regional action 
sometimes happens, but that the equity aims of regionalism may be difficult in 
practice, business stakeholders may yield special influence, and government still 
matters in governance. Research has not centrally focused on a model of governance 
capacity that accounts for power differentials, although these case studies have 
provided insights and challenged the focus on horizontal cooperation.  
What Is the Role of State and Federal Governments in Metropolitan Action?  
Inattention to a larger landscape of political economic realities and the 
continued influence of the nation-state has been one of the central limitations of new 
regionalism, according to critiques in geography (Lovering, 1999; MacLeod, 2001). 
Clark and Christopherson (2009) argue that the fixation on regional characteristics and 
action can imply regions are responsible for economic stagnation and other problems. 
This attribution of responsibility ignores the critical effects of uneven development 
and larger trends.  
Indeed, new regionalism‘s focus has typically been on the horizontal arena—
action within a region—rather than a region‘s relationships to state and federal actors 
and policies. Some regional research may be making a needed shift of attention, 
exemplified by the two case studies above that explicitly tackle vertical relationships 
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and policies (Swanstrom & Banks, 2009; Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2009). In the 
remainder of this section, I describe existing literature, including but not limited to 
NR, on how cities and regions relate to state and federal governments.  
State legislatures and legislation critically affect cities. State laws create cities 
and their potential powers. In other words, state laws carve out a realm for municipal 
action; they create and constrain cities (Frug & Barron, 2008). State legislatures may 
also directly limit municipal efforts. For example, the New York Legislature stymied 
New York City‘s plan for a congestion pricing zone in Manhattan (Frug & Barron, 
2008). 
The state legislature may be an important forum for actors seeking to 
reorganize quasigovernmental institutions to strengthen regional capacity. For 
example, in Miami a business-county coalition had to win state legislative approval to 
reorganize its commuter rail agency but could not win state authorization to levy a 
rental car surcharge (Alpert, Gainsborough & Wallis, 2006). Likewise, Chicago 
leaders had to go to the state legislature to reorganize their metropolitan agencies 
(Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2009). In these examples, state legislatures allowed for 
some quasigovernmental institutional restructuring. Johnson (2006), however, claims 
that states will be unlikely to allow for strong metropolitan governments that could 
challenge state powers. 
In addition to legislative authority, state-level actors can be direct participants 
in metropolitan action and conflict. Johnson (2009) sees the San Francisco highway 
revolt as a conflict between the City of San Francisco and the State of California. 
Indeed, the highway era provides an interesting example of direct conflict between 
 11 
 
states and cities. State highway departments controlled interstate development and 
construction, but cities were at times able to win concessions (Johnson, 2006; 
Luberoff & Altshuler, 1996). On the other hand, state actors can collaborate with city 
leaders, enabling urban initiatives. Knudson‘s (2009) case study of the Hiawatha rail 
line in Minneapolis shows a vital role for governors in implementation. Likewise, in 
an expansion of urban regime theory, Burns and Thomas (2004) provide instances in 
which state-level actors were important urban regime participants, thereby 
contributing capacity to urban initiatives.  
The federal role in transportation has been more direct than in other arenas. 
The federal government‘s interstate highway program helped create powerful, 
roadway-focused state departments of transportation (Lewis & McGee, 2001; Taylor 
& Schweitzer, 2005). Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) use ―bottom-up federalism‖ to 
describe the complex relationship between local leaders and the federal government. 
In the construction of mega-projects, Altshuler and Luberoff explain federal funds 
were important, but local actors were typically the initiators of projects and actively 
fought for funding. Another example is the active lobbying efforts by local 
governments on transportation issues in the early1990s (Lewis & McGee, 2001). The 
subsequent transportation legislation partially devolved transportation decisions from 
states to metropolitan planning organizations.  
To limit the scope of this study and due to its focus on implementation, I 
examine how higher levels of government directly participate in regional action. Of 
course, higher level governments merit more attention, including efforts to place 
regional action within a larger historic, political, and economic context. In this 
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research, I assume that the relationship between levels of government is neither equal 
nor unilateral, adopting a ―bottom-up federalism‖ approach. Even though federal 
programs provide funding, the federal level leaves much of implementation to sub-
national entities. Furthermore, local actors may act back upon new policies, as in the 
lobbying example above.  
How Does Equity Fare in Implementation? 
A concern for social justice motivates my third major area of inquiry. How 
does equity fare in reality, not plan rhetoric? In other words, to what extent do actual 
implementation efforts advance the social justice or equity goals articulated in 
planning and policy? Initial research suggested investments might not be as equitable 
as the comprehensive sets of investments that appear in plans.  
Planning literature offers different concepts of equity or fair distribution. 
Beatley (1994) describes multiple concepts of distributional justice in land use policy 
but favors a definition he derives from Rawls. From this perspective, Beatley argues 
the following criterion for distributive justice: ―Land-use policy can and should be 
evaluated by the extent to which it improves the conditions of the least-advantaged 
members of society‖ (p. 101, emphasis original). Like Beatley, Krumholz (1982) has a 
redistributive angle and concern for the least-advantaged. Krumholz implies a focus 
on opportunities, not conditions, by advancing equity planning as seeking to provide 
more choices for those who have few.  
Taylor (2004) and Taylor and Tassiello Norton (2009) provide a useful 
typology of equity concepts in transportation. They present three types of equity: 
market, opportunity, and outcome. Further complicating the concept of equity, units of 
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analysis can include geographic entities (states, counties, cities), groups (race, class), 
or individuals (citizens, riders), as depicted in Table 1.1. In a market equity 
framework, benefits should be proportional to inputs and payments; for example a 
state would receive federal gas tax funds equal to its contribution. Market equity might 
allow for disparate spending, if the subsidies align with tax contributions. Opportunity 
equity means that funds are spread proportionately. Opportunity equity would result in 
even per capita spending at the individual scale, or alternatively, proportional spending 
among groups or across jurisdictions.
1
 Outcome equity for transportation funding 
would call for equal levels of service across jurisdictions or equal accessibility among 
groups and individuals.  
Table 1.1: Types of transportation equity (Reproduced from Taylor & Tassiello Norton, 2009, 
p. 27). 
 
Planning generally operates outside a market equity framework, as public 
intervention has goals beyond equal market transactions. This research‘s focus is the 
implementation stage of planning, not the actual accessibility effects and results of 
                                                 
1
 Taylor and Tassiello Norton place Rawls in the opportunity equity category, due to Rawls’ concern 
about equal opportunity. Alternatively, Beatley’s deployment of Rawls might fall under the outcome 
equity category, as it seeks to improve conditions for the disadvantaged. Their different uses and 
interpretation of Rawls are outside the scope of this section.  
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public intervention. Thus, I assess transit in terms of opportunity equity. This approach 
considers if spending is equivalent across groups. It roughly aligns with Sanchez and 
Brenman‘s (2007) definition of transportation equity: ―The term transportation equity 
refers to a range of strategies and policies that aim to address inequities in the nation‘s 
transportation planning and project delivery system‖ (p. 7). While Beatley‘s criterion 
of improving conditions for the least advantaged provides a basis for a more stringent 
definition, the former position is likely to be more widely accepted. Furthermore, 
actual investments appear to fail the more moderate opportunity test for equity, 
making a more stringent criterion unnecessary. Thus, I consider whether the public 
sector implements transit infrastructure investment proportionately to serve 
communities of color and low-income neighborhoods. 
Research Subject and Structure 
Before discussing the unique context for the study of transit, I return to the 
concept of governance. As discussed above, governance can be a normative or 
analytical category (Nuissl and Heinrichs, 2011; Pierre, 2005). I avoid a normative 
use. Instead, I use governance as a broad lens of study that places planning in 
relationship to broader, multi-sectoral processes. In other words, I use governance ―as 
a comprehensive analytical category pertaining to the regulation of publicly relevant 
affairs at the interface of state, market, and civil society‖ (Nuissl & Heinrichs, 2011, p. 
47).  
Transit has some advantages as an area of study, as I discuss below. Multiple 
levels of government are quite apparent in transit, as their roles are especially visible 
in its implementation. Transportation has greater levers for regional coordination and 
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equity than other sectors. After describing these advantages, I note unique conditions 
for transit and transportation.  
First, transportation provides an ideal subject area to explore questions of 
regional and multi-level governance, because of the intense involvement of multiple 
levels of government. Despite the increasing use of local option taxes for 
transportation (Goldman & Wachs, 2003), federal and state funds still are critical for 
much of the sector‘s infrastructure expansion and operations. For transit specifically, 
the federal government provides billions annually ($13.5 billion in FY 2010). 
Municipalities, counties and special districts often operate transit agencies and 
interface with metropolitan planning organizations and other players, creating a 
complex picture for research. States take a variable role. 
Second, the contemporary role of government is especially direct and visible 
for transit in the United States. While cities may zone land owned by others and the 
federal government shapes the financing tools for home mortgages used in the private 
sector, government agencies typically build and operate transportation facilities and 
services themselves. This was not always the case. Real estate developers once built 
streetcars to facilitate their building activities (Warner, 1978), and private entities built 
and operated most mass transit services until the mid-twentieth century (Jones, 2008). 
Following the massive influx of federal funds into highways, big city mayors and 
other constituents pressured the federal government to fund transit through first loans, 
then capital grants in 1964 (Jones, 2008), and later operating subsidies. 
Third, transportation, in some ways, may offer ideal conditions for regional 
governance and equity. As early as 1962, federal funding rules required “continuing, 
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comprehensive, and cooperative” metropolitan transportation planning (Zoller & 
Capizzano, 1997). Later legislation required that states designate metropolitan 
planning organizations to lead these activities. To receive federal funds, transportation 
projects must be in MPO plans. Major federal legislation in 1991 and subsequent bills 
strengthened the role of MPOs. They still operate without strong government powers 
and are directed to work in partnership with other transportation entities. The reality 
may fall short of the cooperative and comprehensive regional aspirations behind these 
mandates (Goldman & Deakin, 2000; Innes & Gruber, 2005). Nonetheless, 
transportation still has federal mandates for regional planning, unlike most sectors. 
Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004) even present the federal cooperation 
mandates as a potential model for federal support of regionalism in other sectors. 
Federal rules for MPOs and planning also offer levers for equity. All federal 
agencies must meet the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation issued rules that specified low-income and minority 
groups must not face disproportionate harms or receive fewer or delayed benefits (US 
DOT, 1997). Thus, equity advocates in transportation (and sometimes other fields) 
have used the idea of environmental justice to advance equitable benefits for 
communities. The Federal Highway and Federal Transit Administrations also direct 
members of their staffs, who are responsible for overseeing MPOs, to consider if MPO 
planning processes measure the distribution of benefits and rectify imbalances 
(FHWA & FTA, 1999).  
One interesting challenge for the study of transportation is the range of 
economic interests that can create a pro-infrastructure expansion bias. Capital will 
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benefit from public sector investment in infrastructure, according to Marxist analysis 
(Harvey, 2006; Preteceille, 1976). Growth machine interests (or what others might see 
as civic boosters) rally behind transit infrastructure investment.
2
 Planning firms also 
stand to profit from public transit investment, as do engineering firms and railcar 
makers. Politicians are attracted to the ribbon-cutting opportunities and funds from 
higher levels of government that infrastructure brings (Taylor, 2004). 
Actors support transit infrastructure investment for their direct profit, concern 
for ―regional competitiveness,‖ hopes for reduced emissions, reformed metropolitan 
growth patterns, and increased mobility for the poor (Pucher, 2004). Transit‘s political 
popularity is due to its broad base of supporters: 
So why has transit enjoyed such political success in recent decades? It 
appeals to interests across the political spectrum: downtown and 
construction-related businesses, construction and transit labor unions, 
environmentalists, good-government organizations, advocates for the 
poor, and a wide variety of others who perceive transit as a way of 
reconciling development, equity and amenity goals. (Altshuler & 
Luberoff, 2003, p.217) 
Given the range of goals motivating transit supporters, transit choices can sometimes 
pit environmental goals against equity goals (Grengs, 2004). While not directly the 
focus of this research, the potential for a pro-infrastructure bias is important context, 
as I will return to in my conclusion.  
Another important piece of context is the time frame for and project-focus of 
                                                 
2
 See Whitt (1982) for a detailed look at the business push for rail in San Francisco. 
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transportation planning. Regional transportation planning adopts the language of and 
conducts analysis for regional transportation systems, but plan interventions are almost 
exclusively infrastructure projects. These projects take significant time to develop and 
implement. The implementation of each project may be somewhat distinct, as each 
project involves different stakeholders. Thus, planning may aspire to a regional and 
comprehensive focus, but implementation appears to be project-oriented. Given this 
reality, this research often uses projects as the unit of analysis. 
Framework and Roadmap 
This research adopts a situated, critical governance approach. This approach 
allows insight into not just cooperation and action across sectors, but also differing 
priorities and power as unequal influence. Thus, the following papers use governance 
as an analytic category that expands the process of urban governing to the intersection 
of public, business, and civic actors through formal and informal channels. In seeking 
to understand when these processes build capacity to enable the projects in plans, I 
study ―power to‖ implement plans, but I also attend to how some priorities or actors 
may exert more or less influence on what capacity is mobilized for. Like some recent 
NR literature, I seek to challenge models of regional governance that focus solely on 
the horizontal. I do this by making interscale relationships central to my analysis. I 
orient each paper around a different scale: the metropolitan planning organization, the 
sub-national state, and a federal program. Finally, together these papers expand the 
study of planning beyond explicit planning processes by examining implementation. 
The first paper describes how processes external to MPO planning determine 
plan content in metropolitan Boston and Miami. As a result, projects for low-income 
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and minority neighborhoods in these regions depended on activism, not federal 
directives for equity in regional planning. In the second paper, I describe the role of 
state actors in transit projects proposed in Miami and Orlando. Among the studied 
projects, state-level actors chose to provide more institutional sponsorship—or 
capacity—for projects with greater economic importance and local consensus. The 
differing project outcomes indicate the potentially critical role that state-level actors 
can play and the need to explore multiple tiers of action and types of power. The third 
paper demonstrates the complex interplay between federal investment and local 
governance, through a primarily quantitative analysis of a federal funding program. 
Despite a formal, multi-criteria evaluation, local financial commitment most correlates 
with federal funding outcomes for rail expansion. Together, these papers show a 
continuing role for government in governance, uneven levels of influence or power, 
and a complex intergovernmental relationship.  
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CHAPTER 2: Bypassing Equity 
 
Abstract 
 
Federal transportation legislation strengthened the role of metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs) in the 1990s. During the same period, new federal rules 
increased focus on transportation equity for MPOs and other transportation entities. 
Existing research identifies challenges for regional planning mandates, but the field of 
planning still has limited knowledge of how MPOs, equity requirements, and regional 
planning processes influence actual investments. This research examines whether 
MPO planning can deliver benefits to low-income and minority communities. I 
describe how intergovernmental context affects official, long-range transportation 
plans in a comparison of metropolitan Miami and Boston. In these cases, I find that 
official MPO planning processes have not played a pivotal role in transit choices, 
because of existing intergovernmental contexts. External processes—highway-related 
agreements in Boston and a sales tax in Miami-Dade—bypassed MPO planning and 
determined investments. Each process was linked to action by an established, multi-
purpose government. When projects for low-income and minority communities 
progressed, it was through activism in intergovernmental bypasses to MPO planning. 
Extensive mobilization in Boston has secured two rail investments for low-income 
communities. These cases suggest the need for further planning research on 
intergovernmental context and implementation.   
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Regional planning has become a popular solution to the interrelated problems 
of environment, sprawl and equity (Wheeler, 2002). In the United States, federal 
agencies have recently increased funding for regional cooperation on land use and 
transportation planning. This growing interest offers promise for multi-jurisdictional 
problem solving, but the field of planning still knows too little about how regional 
planning fits into local contexts, with fragmented government capacities. Furthermore, 
regional efforts have frequently prioritized economic development and quality of life 
over social equity objectives (Rast, 2006; Scott, 2007). 
 Federal requirements for metropolitan coordination and equity in 
transportation planning make the sector unique and instructive for the field. Federal 
funding requires that metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) create regional 
transportation plans and evaluate harms and benefits for low-income and minority 
populations. Thus, MPO planning has a statutory basis that other regional planning 
efforts lack in the United States, but research finds that existing patterns of 
government powers and entrenched planning norms limit MPO influence (Goldman & 
Deakin, 2000; Katz, Puentes & Bernstein, 2005; Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2009; 
Wolf & Farquhar, 2005). These studies identify the limits to MPO influence, but have 
not demonstrated how decisions made in intergovernmental contexts relate to MPO 
planning and plans. Furthermore, the existing MPO analyses have not focused on 
equity and the link between plans and implementation.  
This research examines whether MPO planning can deliver investments for 
low-income and minorities communities. I seek to understand what mechanisms 
advance equity goals and how. In Miami and Boston, I focus on the intergovernmental 
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context of MPOs and find critical bypasses—the term I use to refer to these processes 
that occur outside of MPO planning but determine transit investment. Despite federal 
requirements for equity, official regional planning has not been pivotal in advancing 
rail projects for low-income and minority neighborhoods. In Boston, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts made highway mitigation agreements that 
determined transit investment, while in Miami, a sales tax campaign promoted its own 
slate of transit projects. Subsequent MPO planning reflected, rather than directed, such 
choices. When projects for low-income and minority communities have progressed, as 
in Boston, it has been through activism in alternatives to MPO planning. Federal 
directives for equity in regional planning seem to have limited impact, since critical 
decisions on project implementation are made outside of MPO planning. The cases 
raise challenging questions for equity in transit and regional planning, while also 
indicating the need for planning to better understand intergovernmental contexts. The 
findings have utility for practice, because effective changes in MPO design or regional 
planning require a better understanding of intergovernmental structures. 
Regional Transportation Planning & Equity 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations  
Federal law created and then strengthened metropolitan transportation planning 
during the last fifty years. It first required continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative 
metropolitan transportation planning in the 1962 Highway Bill (Zoller & Capizzano, 
1997). Soon thereafter, federal law mandated the creation of metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs) for large urban areas. The composition of MPO boards and their 
rules for making decisions vary, as federal regulations allow local and state officials to 
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structure them (Sanchez, 2006). MPOs conduct required long-range planning, and 
major transportation projects must be part of their plans in order to receive federal 
funds. MPOs remained rather weak until the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity 
Act (ISTEA) of 1991. Among other changes, federal transportation legislation granted 
MPOs control over some funds and directed them to produce fiscally constrained 
plans. In other words, MPO plans must be financially realistic; they cannot simply list 
desired projects. 
MPOs do not control a majority or even a plurality of transportation funds 
expended in their regions. A survey, by the Association of Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations, found about 40 percent of MPOs rely on federal regional planning 
programs to fund most of their operations and planning activities (Sciara & Wachs, 
2007). Securing the required local match (20%) for these federal planning funds has 
been challenging for some MPOs, according to a recent survey by the Governmental 
Accountability Office (2009). Regional planning funds are distinct from the numerous 
federal programs for actual transportation investments, over which MPOs have limited 
control. ISTEA did allow for ―flexing‖ of some surface transportation funds across 
modes. It gave MPOs more control over two federal funding streams, but the two 
funding streams ―are modest compared with other federal transportation dollars‖ 
(Sciara & Wachs, 2007, p. 383). Furthermore, decisions on these funds must be made 
―in consultation‖ with other agencies. Regional sources of transportation funding vary 
tremendously by region. Sciara and Wachs (2007) describe several cases in which 
MPOs were authorized to and able to control locally generated revenue.  
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Equity and MPOs 
Federal rules, based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, require that federal 
agencies consider how they affect low-income and minority communities. With an 
executive order in 1994, President Clinton directed federal agencies to ensure that 
their programs do not create disproportionate harms for low-income and minority 
populations (Sanchez & Brenman, 2007). The U.S. Department of Transportation (US 
DOT) then identified three components of environmental justice/Title VI: (1) ensuring 
that low-income communities and communities of color do not face an unfair share of 
costs or harms, (2) avoiding a delay or reduction of benefits for these populations, and 
(3) enabling their participation in decision making (Deakin, 2007). According to a 
technical guide, released by the Transportation Research Board (Forkenbrock & 
Sheeley, 2004), environmental justice is: ―the fair treatment of all people in terms of 
the distribution of benefits and costs arising from transportation projects, programs, 
and policies‖ (p. 2). With the inclusion of harms and benefits in definitions of Title 
VI/environmental justice, community advocates have used environmental justice (EJ) 
as a rationale for increasing transit investments in low-income and minority 
communities (Deakin, 2007). All agencies that receive federal transportation funds 
must meet Title VI requirements. Eight Title VI complaints were filed with the FTA 
between 2000 and 2007, but the FTA found no Title VI violations (one was resolved 
through a mediated agreement) (TCRP, 2008). According to Sanchez and Brenman 
(2007), there has been little enforcement of Title VI in transportation generally. 
Only MPOs must consider equity across regions, agencies and modes. After 
the US DOT issued rules, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the 
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Federal Transit Administration (FTA) directed their staffs to incorporate Title 
VI/environmental justice into the oversight of metropolitan planning organizations 
(FHWA & FTA, 1999).
 
More specifically, federal staff should consider whether 
MPOs identify the locations and needs of low-income and minority populations, 
include them in planning, analyze the regional distribution of benefits and burdens, 
and address potential ―imbalances‖ (FHWA & FTA, 1999). The agencies, however, 
never released a more developed set of requirements. Thus, despite federal mandates 
for MPOs to incorporate EJ analysis, there are neither clearly defined steps for 
meeting the mandates (Forkenbrock & Sheeley, 2004) nor consensus on appropriate 
conceptual definitions and measures (Robinson, Kuzmyak, Sanchez, Grimshaw & 
Buckely, 2007).  
Metropolitan Planning Organizations and Institutional Contexts 
To outside observers, ISTEA‘s changes made metropolitan planning 
organizations appear to be the lead actors in transportation decisions. The reality is 
more complex due to control of funds and the closely tied division of responsibilities 
and powers among government actors. The intergovernmental context for MPOs limits 
their role. Because plans must be fiscally constrained, MPO plans reflect the choices 
other agencies make for the funds controlled by each agency. Important transportation 
agencies typically include state departments of transportation, transit agencies and port 
authorities.  
Research has found that current intergovernmental contexts blunt the influence 
of MPOs. In a review of surveys and previous research, Wolf and Farquhar (2005) 
explain that state and local entities are more powerful than MPOs. The latter are 
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unequal partners and traditionally show deference to local decisions. Multiple agencies 
control funds, and the proliferation of informal and formal processes creates what 
Weir, Rongerude and Ansell (2009) term ―competing arenas‖ that weaken regional 
forums. In describing how campaigns to levy sales tax for transportation can ―bypass‖ 
planning, Goldman (2007, p. 10) presents MPOs as lacking authority: ―In general, 
MPOs act primarily to accommodate the decisions already made by complex 
constellations of higher- and lower-level governments; they continue to work in the 
coordination tradition of the postwar era in which they were founded.‖ In fact, many 
MPOs are part of the councils of governments that formed in that period. Among the 
50 large MPOs that Sanchez (2006) analyzed, a slight majority were part of a council 
of governments. Federal legislation directs MPOs to work in ―cooperation‖ with state 
departments of transportation and transit agencies. It fails to specify the mechanisms 
for these relationships (Goldman & Deakin, 2000) or the final decision site in the 
iterative process.  
Research on MPO decision making and agency partnerships suggests the depth 
of cooperation is limited, but may be growing. Based on the literature and interviews 
in twenty-four large metros, Goldman and Deakin (2000) find that most state and 
MPO relationships are weak. Still some local governments have forged deeper 
interaction and joint decision making through MPO activities. Innes and Gruber 
(2005) conducted a five-year study of the San Francisco Bay Area's MPO and the 
multi-sector advisory partnership it created. One of the original purposes of the study 
―was to find the degree to which the collaborative planning group…was producing 
decisions that were regional rather than parochial‖ (p. 177). They found so much 
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contention and so little collaboration that they shifted from this focus.  
Partnerships may be gaining strength. Goldman and Deakin found that states 
and MPOs were just beginning to form strong partnerships in their 2000 paper. Gruber 
and Innes‘ observations may have been too soon after ISTEA for collaboration to have 
developed. Furthermore, Taylor and Schweitzer‘s (2005) more recent study of 
fourteen states finds that in some instances mandates for collaboration have 
contributed to greater coordination between states and MPOs.  
Some regional contexts may support regional planning. ―Regional ethos‖ 
contributes to perceptions of success in MPO planning (Goetz, Dempsey, & Larson, 
2002). In Chicago and Los Angeles, ISTEA brought new participants and perspectives 
to transportation planning (Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2009), but their impact 
depended on existing inter-organizational networks and arrangements. More in-depth 
studies are needed to understand how institutional landscapes—especially 
intergovernmental contexts—relate to regional transportation planning and 
implementation, specifically for low-income and minority communities. 
Planning and Institutions 
The need to understand regional transportation planning in context reflects a 
larger need to study planning in its intergovernmental and broader institutional 
landscape. Within the field of planning, dialogue on institutions is fragmented. In line 
with the ―new institutionalisms‖ (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Teitz, 2007), some planning 
academics use ―institution‖ to refer to large-scale processes and intangible norms 
(González & Healey, 2005; Gualini, 2001; Healey, 1999, 2006; Moroni, 2010). 
Studies of institutions as norms will yield useful insights, but the field lacks even 
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extensive discussion of the ―old‖ institutionalism—formal government powers (Lewis, 
1996). Ganapati (2007, p. 166, emphasis original) provides a useful concept of inter-
organizational and inter-agency landscapes as ―institutional structures…the manifest 
arrangement of relationships between organizations,” but I focus more narrowly here. 
I center this analysis on intergovernmental institutions, but incorporate other 
stakeholders as they interface with government agencies. In a mixed methods study of 
metropolitan development and government arrangements, Lewis (1996) provides a 
useful concept of institution, which ―refers to the formal and informal organizations, 
structures, rules, conventions, and standard operating practices‖ (p. 24) that structure 
interactions in political and economic life. Such arrangements matter because they 
provide the backdrop for potential choices and actions: ―These organizational 
arrangements delimit the set of choices available—and imaginable—to political and 
economic actors‖ (Lewis, 1996, p. 24).  
Other research has identified the importance of intergovernmental relationships 
and supra-local structures for local action. Frug and Barron (2008) emphasize the 
importance of government rules and arrangements, especially how the state creates 
municipalities, as well as their powers and constraints. On the other hand, Johnson 
(2006) explores metropolitan regionalism as part of an ongoing struggle over the 
sovereignty of cities and their relationships to the states and federal government. Both 
studies demonstrate that intergovernmental context creates the parameters for 
municipal action.  
Study of planning in relationship to intergovernmental context is limited. 
March (2010) argues institutional context more generally is understudied. In his 
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comparative case studies, he finds ―the institutional framework for planning, at least in 
Victoria [the site of his cases], appears to be the most influential factor affecting 
planning‘s effectiveness. Accordingly, theory divorced from this institutional context 
has little meaning.‖ (p. 121). To improve the utility of plans—regardless of whether 
evaluated along ―performance‖ or ―conformance‖ criteria (see Laurian et al., 2004)—
the field of planning needs greater understanding of the role of intergovernmental 
context. This research responds to the gap in the literature by examining regional 
transportation planning in institutional contexts through a lens of equity. Research 
findings will help inform practice, since effective changes in MPO design or regional 
planning require more information on planning in context.  
Research Design 
As stated in the introduction, this research identifies whether and how MPO 
planning advances equity. I focus on how intergovernmental context influences 
whether regional transportation plans include transit investments for low-income and 
minority communities. I identify the decision making processes outside of MPOs—
what I call bypasses—that determine plan content. The cases involve recent projects, 
to allow time for ISTEA to have affected processes. My focus is on rail capital 
projects for low-income and minority communities, but as Garrett and Taylor (1999) 
discuss, there are many other dimensions of transit equity.  
This research uses qualitative methods and case study design, with 
metropolitan Boston and Miami as cases. Case studies are appropriate for complex 
processes (Yin, 2003) and for studying the links between regions and other scales 
(Harrison, 2006). I conducted all of the semi-structured, twenty-one interviews in 
 35 
 
Boston in 2010, and twenty-one of the thirty-five interviews in Miami during 2009.
3
 
Interviewees were stakeholders from public agencies, business associations and civil 
society organizations, as listed in Appendix I. An extensive document review included 
MPO plans, organizational materials, FTA reports, and media coverage. 
I selected Boston and Miami for their contrasting government structures, as 
related to transportation. While known for its municipal fragmentation (Frug & 
Barron, 2008), metro Boston‘s transportation agencies are unified. The Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) operates extensive bus, commuter rail (365 
miles), subway (38 miles), and light-rail (25 miles) service in Boston and its suburbs. 
The Boston Region Metropolitan Planning Organization is comprehensive, covering 
101 municipalities. On the 14-member MPO board, the Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT) has three seats, including the chair. The region‘s planning 
agency (the Metropolitan Area Planning Council) is vice-chair. The other board 
members are the transit authority (MBTA), the transit authority‘s advisory board, the 
port authority, the City of Boston, and six other municipal representatives. The Federal 
Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, and the MPO‘s Regional 
Transportation Advisory Council are non-voting members.  
In metropolitan Miami, government transportation agencies are far more 
fragmented. Each county oversees its own transit agency. Among the counties, only 
Miami-Dade County operates rail (the 22-mile Metrorail). The operator, Miami-Dade 
Transit, is a unit of the county government. A quasigovernmental authority operates 
                                                 
3
 Miami fieldwork is part of a research project on regional governance, transportation, and 
neighborhoods. The author conducted 21 of 35interviews in Miami, and a senior researcher, Dr. Juliet 
Gainsborough of Bentley University, conducted the remainder. 
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the region‘s one commuter rail line, and some municipalities operate their own 
circulator services. The Florida Department of Transportation even divides the 
metropolitan area into two separate administrative districts. Like the transit agencies, 
each county has its own MPO, and each MPO has a separate long-range transportation 
plan. In Miami-Dade County, the site of the bypass I examine, the MPO board has the 
following members: the county‘s thirteen commissioners; representatives from the 
Miami-Dade Expressway Authority, the Miami-Dade County School Board, and each 
municipality (6) with more than 50,000 residents; two gubernatorial appointees; and 
two non-voting members from the Florida Department of Transportation.  
As metropolitan areas, Boston and Miami provide an interesting combination 
of similarities and contrasts. Both metros are anchors on the Interstate 95 eastern 
corridor and are among the largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the nation, 
with 4.5 million and 5.4 million residents, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008b). 
The Miami MSA has a higher poverty rate and a lower median income than Boston, as 
well as larger shares of black and Latino residents (see Table 2.1). Cuban émigrés and 
other Latinos have become important leaders in business and politics in metropolitan 
Miami. Based on extensive study of immigration and racial relations in Miami, Portes 
and Stepick (1994, Chapter 8) argue that this Latino rise to power makes black 
Miamians, who are disproportionately poor, feel subject to ―double subordination‖ 
under whites and Latinos. In Boston, community and advocacy organizations, many 
based in black neighborhoods, have a long history and strong networks (Medoff & 
Sklar, 1994; Mollenkopf, 1983).  
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Table 2.1: Metropolitan profiles. 
Case Studies: Bypasses and Mobilization 
Boston’s Big Dig and Transit 
Over the last twenty years, strangely enough, highway mitigation agreements 
have partially determined transit investment in metropolitan Boston. During the1990s 
and 2000s, the Massachusetts Office of Transportation and Construction (now 
MassDOT) spent $14.8 billion to build a harbor tunnel and replace Boston‘s 
downtown highway system with underground tunnels. These projects are collectively 
called the Big Dig.  
Unlike some environmental groups, the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) 
would not accept the Big Dig without a guarantee of mitigation measures. In 1990, the 
Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation and Construction, Fred Salvucci, entered 
into negotiations with CLF to avoid litigation that would stall the Big Dig. The 
Conservation Law Foundation pledged not to pursue litigation, if the state met the 
conditions of the resulting memorandum of understanding. The agreement promised 
between $2 billion and $4 billion of transit expansion, but the state and CLF reached 
the agreement without consulting the public (Luberoff & Altshuler, 1996). In the 
 Economic data Hispanic/
Latino 
Not Hispanic/Latino 
 Total 
population 
Poverty 
rate 
Median 
house-
hold 
income 
Any race White  Black Asian 
Miami, 
FL-MSA 
5.4 
million 
 
13% 
 
$49,965 
 
39% 38% 
 
19% 
 
2% 
Boston, 
MA-MSA 
4.5 
million 
9% $70,344 8% 78% 6% 6% 
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1990s, the state‘s failure to implement the agreement led to legal action and new 
agreements with CLF and environmental agencies. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
Massachusetts implemented several of the pledged transit expansions, like the 
Greenbush Commuter Rail Line. Such capital expansions have led to a large debt for 
the MBTA; debt payments absorb more than one-quarter of the MBTA‘s budget 
(Kladko, 2006, January 22). 
Meanwhile, in the early 2000s, community and advocacy organizations raised 
issues related to the insufficient share of rail investment that benefited Boston‘s black 
communities. In 2001, the Washington Street Corridor Coalition filed a complaint 
with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). The group argued that the transit 
agency had failed to adequately replace a dismantled rail line in the heart of Roxbury, 
a black community, and was thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The FTA 
found no wrongdoing (TCRP, 2008), but community groups continue to push for new 
rail investment, citing unmet promises and environmental injustice (Marin & Terrell, 
2005; Interviewee).  
An overlapping set of activists also engaged with the MPO, pressing federal 
agencies to take action on equity planning requirements. As a result, in 2001, the 
Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration directed the 
Boston Region MPO to assess the distribution of plan benefits and link this analysis to 
its selection of projects (Peterson, Rasmussen & Kaplan, 2007). Eventually, however, 
the advocates came to believe that federal agencies would not force real change: ―the 
feds were really unwilling to really back us on the important issues of equity metrics 
and a real measurement of whether we were getting a fair share and getting adequate 
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services‖ (Interviewee). Thus after more than a year on the MPO committee, the 
advocates withdrew from the process. They saw other arenas as more promising for 
pursuing equitable transit investment.  
1990 Initial agreement between the Conservation Law Foundation & Mass. 
Secretary of Transportation and Construction 
1990s Some new CLF/Mass agreements; implementation of some transit 
commitments, especially suburban commuter rail 
MPO plans include Big Dig commitments, but with additional transit 
expansions 
1999-
2000 
(approx.) Four Corners Action Coalition begins advocacy for 
Fairmount/Indigo Line 
2001 Federal agencies direct the MPO to address equity 
2002 MBTA pledges half the funds for the Fairmount Commuter Rail 
improvements 
Equity groups withdraw from MPO committee 
2003 Community groups start pushing for Green Line extension; Somerville 
Transportation Equity Partnership forms 
2004 CDCs form Fairmount/Indigo Coalition 
2005 Mobilization by STEP & community groups esp. to meetings  
State representatives successfully secure state funds for Fairmount 
Final (?) CLF/Mass. revised agreement includes Fairmount project and 
Green Line as the only remaining transit expansions 
2005-
current 
Massachusetts DOT begins environmental planning for Green Line 
extension, community stays involved in planning stations, access points, 
promoting community path, etc. 
Refurbishing of stations begins, community-led planning for stations 
and areas (some led by CDCs) 
Most recent fiscally constrained MPO plan includes only two major transit 
capacity expansions: the Green Line extension and the Fairmount Commuter 
Rail Improvements  
Table 2.2: Boston timeline. Blue indicates events related to Fairmount/Indigo Line; 
green indicates events related to the Green Line extension; and black indicates other 
events. 
 During the 1990s and 2000s, Big Dig transit commitments largely determined 
which projects the state and transit agency implemented. Despite some transit 
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investment, in 2005, the Conservation Law Foundation threatened legal action because 
of insufficient implementation, especially in the urban core (CLF, 2005). The state and 
CLF negotiated a new agreement that in effect determined the only two rail 
expansions in the MPO‘s current long-range plan (CTPS, 2009). Because the current 
MPO plan reflects the increasingly limited fiscal capacity of the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, the only major rail expansion projects it includes are those 
in the newest agreement, a Green Line extension and the Fairmount Commuter Rail 
Line improvements.
4
 Community activism has influenced which two rail projects were 
in the agreement and contributed to some progress on equity goals. 
Community-based organizations have advanced the Fairmount Commuter Rail 
Line improvement project, which will increase access to rail in underserved black 
neighborhoods. In the late nineties, the Greater Four Corners Action Coalition and 
other advocates argued that residents in the black communities of Dorchester and 
Mattapan suffered from diesel fumes but could not access service on the 9-mile 
Fairmount Commuter Rail Line. These neighborhoods are part of a gap in rapid rail 
service that aligns with a concentration of black residents in southern Boston, as seen 
in Figure 2.2. The map in Figure 2.2 displays the two pending investments with their 
planned stations, the existing heavy and light-rail system, and the share of black 
residents in each census tract.  
                                                 
4
 The two rail projects that I discuss are the only transit expansion projects costing over $100 million 
(see CTPS, 2009 pp. 12-6 to 12-11). 
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Figure 2.1: Boston rail infrastructure and black population. 
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Activists proposed a hybrid commuter rail/rapid transit service along the 
Fairmount corridor, with added stops and increased frequency. The transit agency 
pledged half of the funds to add stops. Community development corporations (CDCs) 
then formed the Fairmount/Indigo Corridor Coalition. The coalition worked with state 
representatives, who secured the remainder of funds for stops in a 2005 state budget. 
The project subsequently became part of the latest agreement between CLF and the 
state. One interviewee suggested that the state had proposed adding the Fairmount 
Corridor to the revised agreement because funds for the project were already reserved 
in the state budget. The four new stops and other infrastructure improvements, which 
come at a cost of $114 million (CTPS, 2009), will bring rail into walking distance for 
thousands of low-income and minority residents. With infrequent service, however, 
the benefits—and equity gains—may be modest. CDCs are working with federal 
agencies and other community partners to promote transit-oriented development, a 
related greenway, and further study of increased service frequency (Interviewee).  
Residents of Somerville, a diverse municipality (pop. 69,662; US Census 
Bureau, 2008a) that borders Boston, have mobilized to support an extension of the 
Green Line. The state first promised the rail extension in the 1990 CLF agreement. 
According to current plans, the light-rail extension will cost $954 million and add six 
new stations along 4 miles (with an additional .5 mile spur). The extension will 
traverse census tracts that the MPO identifies as low-income; these tracts have many 
minority residents, though not a disproportionate share. Several years ago, municipal 
leaders, Somerville residents, and a coalition called the Somerville Transportation 
Equity Partnership increased pressure to implement the extension. One activist 
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explained the community‘s efforts: 
What we decided to do was raise awareness about the Green Line issue 
and what was going on and start a campaign to get people to write 
letters to the MPO...We kept it up with articles in the local papers and 
stuff like that…We had this meeting at the high school 
planned…almost 500 people showed up. The MBTA was floored. They 
were stunned. 
The state is moving forward on planning the line, but Somerville residents continue to 
appear at transportation agency meetings. The community mobilization around the 
project likely ensured that this project, which will serve mostly low-income census 
tracts, remained in the latest agreement.  
 For both projects, the state forum acted as a bypass to the MPO planning 
process. Decisions made within intergovernmental context—outside of formal MPO 
planning—in turn determined the content of the MPO‘s plan. Through sustained 
mobilization, not simply because of federal requirements for equity in planning, 
advocates were able to advance rail projects for low-income and minority 
neighborhoods.  
South Florida and the Miami-Dade People’s Transportation Plan 
A Miami-Dade County sales tax campaign and related county decisions have 
bypassed the MPO and determined transit investment in metropolitan Miami. Voters 
had rejected transportation sales tax referenda since the 1970s (Viglucci, 2002, 
October 27), but in 2002 they passed a ballot measure to increase sales tax. Through 
extensive public outreach, County Mayor Penelas and his office created a list of 
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projects that became the ―People‘s Transportation Plan‖ (PTP). According to the PTP, 
Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) would dramatically expand bus service, provide free 
passes for seniors, and increase Metrorail service to 24 hours a day. For the longer 
term, the plan promised up to 88.9 miles of rapid transit. MDT would implement all of 
this with $120 million (estimated) from sales tax revenue annually. In 2002, voters 
passed the half-cent sales tax referendum to support the People‘s Transportation Plan 
(Viglucci, 2002, November 6). 
The top rail priority in the PTP was the North Corridor Metrorail extension, 
which would serve the populous black communities north of Miami (see Figure 2.3). 
Representing this area, County Commissioner Betty Ferguson negotiated for language 
stating that the North Corridor was the top priority: 
We were convinced as a community that if we supported the half-penny 
sales tax that that extension would come to pass, that North Corridor, as 
we‘re calling it. Because the half-penny sales tax would support the 
build-out of that extension. That is what we were told; that is what I 
was convinced. I was sitting on the commission at the time…I asked 
them to put that in writing, that the North Corridor extension would be 
the number-one priority as to how that half-penny sales tax would be 
used for the Metrorail build-out. They put it in writing. (Commissioner 
Ferguson at community group meeting.) 
County officials had originally promised the North Corridor line in the 1970s (Charite, 
2008, May 7). Miami‘s one Metrorail line was part of an envisioned network, but 
securing federal funds for more lines already appeared challenging in 1984, when the 
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first line opened (Anderson, 1984, May 20). Some black community members believe 
that Latino leaders orchestrated the decision to route the first—and only existing—line 
northwest to Hialeah, a largely Latino community. 
 If the commitment to make the North Corridor the top PTP priority was the 
end of the story, the bypass would have secured rail investment for an underserved 
black community; however, county-level decisions have made the North Corridor‘s 
implementation unlikely. One problem is that the PTP‘s estimated costs (2002) were 
dramatically lower than current implementation prices (Lebowitz, March 18, 2008). 
Furthermore, the county commission and a trust overseeing the sales tax funds have 
allowed MDT to use sales tax to fund delayed capital needs, like replacement of 
Metrorail cars and office facilities. One interviewee explained: 
[F]rom the minute it was passed, Miami-Dade Transit was trying to get 
its hands on that money, because it needed it—because it was running a 
deficit operation…So there‘s not enough money really to complete 
anywhere close to what they said they were going to do. 
In 2004, the county commission authorized sales tax funds for the only rail 
extension that MDT will implement. The ―AirportLink‖ is a two-mile spur connecting 
Metrorail to the Miami International Airport‘s intermodal center (see Figure 2.3). The 
rationale for implementing this project first was that it could advance more quickly 
than the top priority North Corridor, which needed federal funds. When the 
commission approved AirportLink, it was to require only $160 million of sales tax 
funds, but now will absorb $426 million in sales tax revenue.   
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Figure 2.2: Miami rail infrastructure and black population. 
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1970s Planning for Metrorail, first line routed to Hialeah, pledge for line to 
black communities north of Miami  
2002 Mayor Penelas leads the development of the People‘s Transportation 
Plan and successful referendum campaign for half-cent sales tax 
Commissioner Ferguson pushes for North Corridor as top priority in 
PTP implementation 
2004 County commission authorizes funds for AirportLink ($160 million) 
2009 County commission votes to redirect most sales tax funds to Miami-
Dade Transit‘s (MDT) general funds 
MDT plan includes no specific investments for North Corridor 
AirportLink‘s budget now uses $426 million of sales tax revenue 
 Table 2.3: Miami timeline. 
With MDT in poor fiscal condition and unable to implement the promised 
projects, in March 2009, the Board of County Commissioners voted to redirect most of 
the sales tax revenue to Miami-Dade Transit‘s general fund. MDT‘s most recent ten-
year plan includes the AirportLink as its only rail expansion and states that it will 
―pursue incremental and affordable transit improvements [for the North 
Corridor]…until heavy rail funding options are identified‖ (MDT, 2009, p. 9-2).  
Within this context of campaigns and decisions, MPO planning appears to 
reflect rather than determine transit choices. The PTP process bypassed MPO 
planning, even as it prioritized a project for northern Dade black communities. While 
promising to ―consult‖ with the MPO on a ―draft plan‖ (Ross, 2002, January 31), 
Mayor Penelas and his team controlled the slate of projects in the People‘s 
Transportation Plan. A social justice group, People Acting for Community Together 
(PACT), was briefly involved in MPO activities but then shifted its focus to the PTP 
efforts and did not re-engage with the MPO: 
PACT came to a few of the meetings at our [MPO] board and then an 
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effort was made by the same commissioners to invite them… [to 
participate in the PTP campaign] and they accepted… I think that was 
the last we heard from that group. (Interviewee) 
PACT successfully fought to include the purchase of more buses in the PTP (PACT, 
n.d.). As noted above, the other major equity success in the PTP was due to an elected 
official, not to MPO equity objectives. After the referendum, the MPO's next long-
range plan incorporated the new PTP projects and funds (Gannett Fleming, 2005).  
The most recent MPO plan also incorporates decisions made outside of its 
planning process, but now the county will not implement the promised North Corridor. 
Miami-Dade Transit‘s current (MDT, 2009) ten-year plan reflects the lack of funds to 
build the North Corridor. As discussed above, MPO plans must be financially 
constrained and incorporate external funding decisions. Thus, without funds identified 
by the implementing agency, the MPO excluded the North Corridor from its current 
fiscally constrained, long-range year plan (Gannett Fleming, 2009). Like the Boston 
case, the structure of intergovernmental responsibilities makes plans subject to 
decisions outside of the MPO arena.  
Discussion: Regional Planning and Institutional Context 
These two case studies demonstrate four tendencies: the influence of 
intergovernmental context, decision sites as existing multi-purpose governments, the 
inadequacy of federal planning directives given the first two observations, and finally 
that activism can sometimes advance projects. 
 In Miami and Boston, bypasses in the intergovernmental context for MPO 
planning have determined transit investment decisions. Government actors—
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sometimes influenced by activism in these bypasses—first made funding choices. The 
MPOs then adapted regional plans to these agencies‘ decisions. In Boston, the state‘s 
Big Dig agreements with an environmental group brought transit investment but 
bypassed regional decision making. Until recently, the MPO‘s long-range plan 
included transit projects beyond the state commitments. Now with limited funds, the 
MPO plan includes only the state‘s promised projects. In South Florida, the Miami-
Dade County mayor‘s office created the People‘s Transportation Plan (PTP) as part of 
a sales tax campaign in 2002. Because of county commission decisions, the resulting 
sales tax revenue will fund the AirportLink and Miami-Dade Transit‘s general 
expenses, not the PTP‘s top priority. The most recent MPO plan reflects these county 
decisions. 
The critical bypasses in Miami and Boston extend beyond the formal 
boundaries of government by including multiple stakeholders, but established, multi-
purpose government entities were still the main actors and arenas. The importance of 
ad hoc processes and community actors could justify urban governance‘s interest in 
activity beyond formal structures. Yet action in both regions centered on a formal, 
multi-purpose government: the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Miami-Dade 
County. The government tier targeted by these bypasses also dominates the MPO 
board membership in each region. Interviewees repeatedly mentioned the state‘s 
chairmanship of and multiple seats on the Boston Region MPO board, while Miami-
Dade‘s thirteen county commissioners have the majority of seats on that board. Given 
the disconnect between the bypasses and MPO processes, it seems unlikely that the 
MPO boards determined the site of the bypasses. Rather, board membership and 
 50 
 
bypasses that align suggest the importance of underlying divisions of power and 
responsibilities among government agencies, indicating the continuing importance of 
government in governance. The arrangement of powers, funds, and structures among 
government agencies may determine where critical decisions occur—and perhaps 
make some decisions more likely than others. 
In Miami and Boston, intergovernmental context made federal mandates for 
equity in MPO planning insufficient for advancing rail in low-income and minority 
communities. Bypasses in which other government agencies made critical funding 
decisions—sometimes through engagement with CBOs—determined funding 
outcomes. Because MPO plans must be fiscally constrained, they must reflect such 
funding choices. Other agencies that receive federal transportation funds must comply 
with Title VI provisions, but may lack the multimodal, multi-jurisdictional perspective 
that MPOs must adopt. When projects for low-income and minority communities 
moved forward in these cases, their success was due to activism, not federal equity 
directives for MPO planning. Community mobilization and action by elected officials 
thus appear to be key variables behind rail implementation in low-income and 
minority neighborhoods. In Boston, transportation agencies are implementing two rail 
projects in low-income neighborhoods, due to extensive community mobilization. The 
smaller investment, the Fairmount Commuter Rail project, will serve a majority black 
neighborhood. In Somerville, community organizations and elected officials leveraged 
the agreement between the state and the Conservation Law Foundation. In Miami, 
some early negotiations by a county commissioner made the North Corridor the top 
priority in the PTP. While black community leaders support the North Corridor, 
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community advocates and the county have not made the North Corridor their highest 
priority for activism. 
Directions for Research and Practice 
As planners who see the externalities of the current transportation system and 
the challenges for coordinating across boundaries, we may hold high hopes for equity 
planning directives and MPO-led regional planning. A critical lesson for practice and 
future transportation legislation, however, is that directives and hopes for planning 
must better incorporate the reality of current intergovernmental arrangements, 
responsibilities and funds. One Boston stakeholder explained this: 
[T]he rules and regulations that relate to MPOs from the federal 
government really need to be reconsidered. It‘s almost like a system 
that supports the illusion of choice…I completely appreciate and 
respect the amount of time and energy that people put into the 
MPOs…But I think we need to be more thoughtful about what we want 
the MPOs to be responsible for, what we want the states to be 
responsible for, and what we want the federal government to be 
responsible for. And, be more honest about both the resources that are 
available and the context for which the decisions are being made. 
Katz, Puentes & Bernstein (2005) argue that funds need to be more fully 
devolved to MPOs, whereas Sciara and Wachs (2007) present cases in which 
MPOs have been able to generate local revenue—presumably both changes 
would strengthen the MPO role. Alternately, MPOs could play a different role, 
serving solely as capacity-building and information sharing entities without 
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engaging in their own planning process.  
Case study findings suggest the importance of intergovernmental context for 
planning. In Miami and Boston, critical decisions bypassed the MPO, but tended to be 
oriented around established, multi-purpose governments. Because of decisions made 
elsewhere, federal equity directives did not advance projects for low-income and 
minority communities. Investment for these communities advanced through activism 
and more successfully in Boston. Further research could identify the contributions that 
MPOs can and do make to regional decision making. Research could identify when 
and how planning is a critical forum for advancing equity or other goals.  
Another question for the field of planning is what role the federal government 
can and should play in transit equity. The federal government is deeply involved in 
transportation through its administration of funds. For community leaders, the finding 
that mobilization (rather than a set of federal directives) brings benefits may not be 
surprising. The success in Boston is encouraging for community organizations and 
provides another rationale for political organizing and capacity building. Nonetheless, 
it appears that regional planning and federal directives contribute insufficiently to the 
equity goals they describe. Pursuing the goal of equitable investment has required 
mobilization in the very communities where other issues are pressing and resources 
are most limited. Low-income communities can sometimes mobilize effectively, and a 
federally imposed definition of what is ―just‖ or ―good‖ could disempower them. 
Nonetheless, the federal government could more actively define equitable investment, 
at least for the use of its funds. This could prompt further discussion on the equity 
implications of the federal preference for capital rather than operating subsidies 
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(Garrett & Taylor, 1999). 
The Boston and Miami-Dade cases could provide a rationale for an enhanced 
federal role in redressing current inequities and past promises. Black community 
leaders in each region describe a history of disinvestment and inequity. They are 
frustrated because of government failure to deliver promised infrastructure. In each 
case study, a promised project, the North Corridor in Miami and the rail line 
replacement in Boston‘s Roxbury neighborhood, may not be the most cost-effective 
project for the region. These projects, however, could serve many more people, at a 
more reasonable cost, than others in the federal pipeline. Should the federal 
government help fund promised projects for low-income and minority communities if 
investments bring real benefits? Should the federal government more actively ensure 
that its rail capital investments support service to low-income and minority 
communities? 
Plans and some studies assert interdependency among equity, the environment 
and economic prosperity, but plan implementation may enhance one more than the 
others. This research has demonstrated that federal equity provisions for regional 
planning have limited impact because intergovernmental arrangements affect plans 
and transit choices. In actual implementation, environment, equity, and economic 
goals may clash. As Grengs (2004) points out, the goals of luring suburbanites from 
their cars to transit and serving transit-dependent riders may conflict, but they are not 
mutually exclusive. A recent Urban Institute report (Been et al., 2010) explores how 
federal action on sustainability could have unanticipated negative consequences for 
equal access to opportunity and vice versa. Planning processes should reflect that in 
 54 
 
implementation synergy is not automatic, nor are resources unlimited. This may 
actually help the field better grapple with multiple priorities to create synergy and 
enhance regional planning in its existing intergovernmental contexts. 
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CHAPTER 3: Sub-National States, Power and Transit Implementation 
 
Abstract 
Despite ambitious transportation plans, local agencies fail to implement many 
proposed rail projects, due to the immense institutional and financial capacity needed 
to finance and build them. Numerous private actors and government agencies 
influence rail implementation outcomes, but the role of sub-national states is 
especially understudied, due in part to the focus on intrametropolitan capacity in new 
regionalism and urban governance literature. This research examines how state-level 
actors influence project implementation. I argue that state-level actors contribute 
capacity—what Stone (1989, 2006) calls ―power to‖—implement rail proposals, but 
also exert ―power over‖ regional and local actors by uneven participation across 
implementation efforts. In case studies from Orlando and Miami, I find the state‘s role 
varied more among projects than between regions. The Florida Department of 
Transportation pledged millions of dollars for each project, but only sponsored the two 
projects with a regional consensus behind them and economic significance beyond 
their service corridors. By choosing where to more greatly enable projects, state-level 
actors contributed to the termination of two other projects, thereby exerting ―power 
over‖ regional implementation choices. The pivotal role of the sub-national state in 
these case studies, as well as the interplay between capacity and influence, indicate the 
need for future research on multiple types of power and tiers of government in 
implementation.  
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Across the United States, regional plans include numerous rail projects, but 
many fail to materialize. Implementation barriers include the mitigation requirements 
of our ―do no harm‖ era (Altshuler & Luberoff , 2003), limited funds, and fragmented 
government responsibilities. To overcome such barriers, multiple actors must 
assemble sufficient capacity and funding for implementation. To better understand 
why some projects generate sufficient support and resources, this research examines 
the variable role of sub-national state actors, an understudied topic in new regionalism 
and urban governance research. In the cases I study, I find that state-level actors 
contribute vital capacity, and state-level choices on how much to support specific 
regional initiatives affect whether projects are actualized or terminated. The uneven 
implementation of regional transit visions could contribute to outcomes that in effect 
favor some plan priorities over others. 
The challenge of actualizing regional visions and goals, such as increased 
transit use and infrastructure, has spurred interest in building capacity beyond city 
boundaries and between government, business and civic society. New regionalism and 
urban governance research explores and sometimes promotes efforts across sectors 
that build capacity, frequently through horizontal, cooperative and informal 
mechanisms. Interest in regional or local cooperation is understandable due to 
devolution, jurisdictional fragmentation, and challenges for metropolitan action, but 
governance frameworks have generally failed to account for the role of higher tiers of 
government, as well as unequal influence in collaborative efforts.  
This paper explores how state-level actors influence transit implementation 
choices. I propose that explaining the partial implementation of rail plans requires a 
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multi-scalar analysis of capacity, what Stone (1989, 2006) terms ―power to,‖ and 
unequal influence, ―power over‖ as discussed by Gendron and Domhoff (2009). After 
reviewing the literature, I describe the role of state-level actors in four proposed rail 
projects from Orlando and Miami. In each region, I focus on the most recent major 
project to reach implementation and a second project that was advanced but not 
implemented. Among the projects I examine, the state role varied more by project than 
by region. The state sponsored rail investments with regional consensus behind them 
and economic significance beyond their service corridors. I suggest in these instances, 
state-level actors exerted ―power over‖ local implementation outcomes, not primarily 
by obstructing other rail efforts, but by selectively supporting projects. In an era of 
limited resources, funds expended for one project deplete funds available for another 
in the same region, even as the pool of available funds can increase through policy 
measures. Prioritizing some projects or initiatives can crowd out other possibilities—
capacity can become ―power over,‖ a topic unexplored in the governance literature. 
New regionalism and urban governance research will yield only a partial 
understanding of implementation without a better understanding of the effects of 
uneven influence and higher levels of government. 
Regional Governance, Power and the Sub-National State 
New regionalists employ varied rationale to argue for increased regional 
governance capacity. Economic justifications include suburban dependence on the 
central city and a shared need for improved regional economic competitiveness 
(Brenner, 2002; Pastor, Lester & Scoggins, 2009). These justifications may stem from 
hopes to win suburban support, but the evidence for these claims is mixed or qualified 
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(Swanstrom, 2001). Some critics of new regionalism contend that it overlooks equity 
issues, in effect, as it prioritizes smart growth, economic competitiveness, and quality 
of life (Rast, 2006; Scott, 2007). On the other hand, ―social new regionalists,‖ 
according to Kipfer and Wirsig (2004), call for regional action to address current 
metropolitan inequities (e.g. Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, 2004).  
New regionalists call for a governance model of coordination in practice and 
go beyond analysis of government in research. Governance can be thus both an 
analytic category and a normative idea (Nuissl & Heinrichs, 2011; Pierre, 2005). 
Previous metropolitan reform efforts sought to reorganize government structures, but 
new regionalism emerged in the 1990s with an emphasis on cooperative and 
interjurisdictional, horizontal ―governance‖ arrangements (Hamilton, 2004). 
Governance differs from government due to its emphasis on informal institutions and 
participation by business and civil society (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). It describes 
cooperative action, by the public and private sectors, to reach shared ends. In other 
words, urban governance is ―the pursuit of collective goals through an inclusive 
strategy of resource mobilization‖ (Pierre, 2005, p. 449). Governance research has 
increased knowledge about the role of private actors and cooperation, but diverted 
attention from conflict (Davies, 2005; Minnery, 2007) and the nation-state (Davies, 
2002). 
 Research on new regionalism has frequently overlooked the importance of 
context and national policies (Clark & Christopherson, 2009; Lovering, 1999; 
MacLeod, 2001). Clark and Christopherson contend that new regionalism often 
attributes economic conditions to endogenous regional characteristics, ―rather than to a 
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more broadly defined economic and political environment that produces patterns of 
uneven development‖ (p. 343). Related theoretical debates in geography on what 
constitutes a ―region‖ raise important questions about our understandings of places 
and economic and social relationships across space (Pike, 2007). How researchers and 
practitioners define ―regions‖ may have important implications for their findings and 
selection of appropriate scales for intervention, but new regionalism has not typically 
wrestled with this question.  
Certainly the role of nation-states is critical—if not paramount—but the sub-
national state is another significant aspect of regional context and is under researched 
(Hamilton, Miller & Paytas, 2004; Weir, Holman & Swanstrom, 2005). State 
legislation both creates municipal powers and constrains cities‘ options (Frug & 
Barron, 2008). The relationship between cities and states can be one of conflict and 
tension (Burns & Thomas, 2008). For example, Johnson (2009) interprets the San 
Francisco highway revolt as a power struggle between the City of San Francisco and 
California.  
State-level actors, on the other hand, may contribute capacity to urban 
initiatives. Knudson (2009) finds Governor Jesse Ventura built support for the 
Minneapolis Hiawatha light-rail, by making the rail line an effort to improve the 
competitiveness of Minnesota as a whole. Burns and Thomas (2004) use New Orleans 
development alliances to assert that gubernatorial-led coalitions are a distinctive urban 
regime type and that urban regime scholars can address deficiencies in the theory by 
considering extra-local actors who contribute to regimes. Smith (2010) criticizes their 
expansion of urban regime theory and proposes an alternative ―triad‖ framework to 
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underscore the importance of the state government, special purpose authorities, and 
local government in urban development.  
Regional research on the role of the state has garnered insights, primarily on 
state rules and legislative coalitions, but has not generated a new governance 
framework to account for the state role. State rules are most likely to increase the 
likelihood of regional coordination when they ―create incentives for local politicians to 
consider not only the local but also the regional implications of their actions 
and…make more visible the shared fortunes of city and suburban localities within a 
metropolitan area‖ (Gainsborough, 2001, p. 509). According to Gainsborough‘s study 
of Los Angeles and Houston, however, state rules promoting regionalism may still 
hinge on local political will to use authorized government powers. Weir, Wolman and 
Swanstrom (2005) caution that ―[a]t a time when central cities are more dependent on 
their states than ever, there is considerable evidence that their clout in state legislatures 
is continuing to erode‖ (p. 756). Metropolitan coalitions between central cities and 
inner-ring suburbs may provide an alternative to the weakening coalition models—
party-imposed, governor-brokered, and interest-based—that have historically 
supported central city priorities in state legislatures (Weir et al.). Some research has 
found, though not focused centrally on, the ability of state legislatures and agencies to 
constrain or enable regional action (Alpert, Gainsborough & Wallis, 2006; Swanstrom 
& Banks, 2009; Weir, Rongerude & Ansell, 2009). Finally, based on studies of 
Chicago and Los Angeles, Weir, Rongerude and Ansell argue vertical power—at 
higher levels of government—is a necessary addition to horizontal—within region—
collaboration to create influential regional forums.  
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This research contributes to the emerging literature on the state role in 
metropolitan regions through examining state-level actors‘ action in transit 
implementation. Unlike the metropolitan research on state rules, I focus on the state as 
a participant in regional governance. I expand the treatment of the state as a member 
in urban coalitions to a larger metropolitan picture. Furthermore, unlike much of the 
new regionalism research, I use a dual concept of power. Rather than contrasting 
vertical and horizontal power, as Weir, Rongerude and Ansell (2009) do, I examine 
different aspects of one stakeholder‘s power. I argue state-level support can be an 
important contribution of ―power to,‖ but that state-level choices on how and when to 
support project efforts can act as ―power over‖ that influences which components of 
regional transit plans are implemented or not. 
From political science work on urban regimes, I use the concept of ―power to‖ 
as capacity. Typically focused just on primary cities, urban regime literature often has 
an explicit interest in power as capacity. According to Stone (1989), the challenge of 
urban governance is bringing together the capacities needed for change in a 
fragmented world: ―the power struggle concerns, not control and resistance, but 
gaining and fusing a capacity to act – power to, not power over” (p. 229, emphasis 
original). Such emphasis on capacity building as an object of study aligns with new 
regionalism‘s focus on or goal of collective mobilization for shared ends, an implicit 
adoption of ―power to.‖ 
Urban sociologists have argued, conversely, that a different type of power 
explains urban outcomes. In this framework, some players exert significant influence 
to promote urban interventions for their own interests. According to Molotch and 
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Logan (Logan & Molotch 1987; Molotch, 1976), downtown businesses and real estate 
interests, with support from other institutions like media outlets, sports teams and 
universities, fundamentally seek to increase the exchange or monetary value of land in 
a competitive capitalist system. Through their constant interaction with local 
government, the private interests in this growth coalition build ―systemic‖ power 
(Logan & Molotch) and drive urban agendas. Gendron and Domhoff (2009), likewise, 
argue the profit-seeking, growth machine coalition typically exerts ―power over‖ local 
decisions. Gendron and Domhoff use ―power over‖ interchangeably with distributive 
power in which ―the emphasis is on the efforts of one group or class to dominate other 
groups or classes for its own profit or benefit‖ (p. 187) .  
More study of the relationship between ―power to‖ and ―power over‖ is 
warranted (Gendron, 2006), as both may offer only partial understanding of 
governance. Stone (1989) does acknowledge ―power to‖ and ―power over‖ may 
sometimes overlap: ―There is, of course, a point at which the two kinds of power 
merge, and a superior power to form a regime spills over into a kind of domination‖ 
(p. 229). I look at this interrelationship: how contributions of ―power to‖ by state 
actors can exert unilateral influence or ―power over‖ metropolitan outcomes by 
enabling some projects and in effect foreclosing other possibilities. This dual concept 
of power may be useful for interpreting governance coalitions more broadly, but I 
illustrate its utility for and the importance of understanding the sub-national state role 
in the cases that follow. 
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Research Design & Case Studies 
This research uses comparative case studies, which are appropriate for 
understanding complex phenomena (Yin, 2003) and regions‘ relationships to other 
scales (Harrison, 2006). Selecting two metropolitan areas within one state, Miami and 
Orlando, allowed me to focus on the variability of the state‘s role by project and 
region, rather than on variability between states. In each region, I examine the most 
recent, major rail project that is being implemented and the most recent, major project 
that advanced toward implementation but ultimately without success. Table 3.1 
displays general information about each project.  
 Status Length 
(miles) 
Rider-
ship 
(long-
term)  
Federal 
cost-
effective
-ness 
rating 
Capital 
cost 
Funding sources 
      Federal 
New 
Starts 
State  Local 
Miami: 
North 
Corridor  
Uncertain/ 
unlikely 
9.5 22,600 
(2030) 
Medium $1.6 
billion 
43% 28% 28% 
Miami: 
AirportLink 
Under 
construction 
2.4 n/a n/a $526 
million 
0% 
 
19% 81% 
Orlando: I-
Drive light-
rail 
 
Terminated 14.6 103,700 
(2020) 
Medium-
high
5
 
$600 
million 
55% 22.5% 22.5%  
Orlando: 
SunRail 
 
Under 
contract 
31 7,400 
(2030) 
Medium-
low 
$416 
million
6
 
50% 25% 
 
25% 
Table 3.1: Project profiles. 
Data collection methods were qualitative. As part of a larger research project, 
                                                 
5
 The light-rail project‘s cost-effectiveness is based on the cost per new transit rider, while the other 
ratings use the current FTA measure (cost per hour of transit system user benefit). As a result, the 
project‘s cost-effectiveness might be underrated relative to the other projects. 
6
 Some news articles report the cost at $1.2 billion. See Footnote 12 for more discussion. 
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in 2009 the author visited each region twice and a senior researcher
7
 once (six site 
visits total in 2009). We conducted approximately thirty-five interviews in South 
Florida, thirty in Central Florida, and six in Tallahassee, Florida‘s capital; 
interviewees are listed in Appendix I. Interviews were typically an hour, though they 
ranged in length from approximately fifteen minutes to two hours. We identified initial 
interviewees through organizational and governmental websites, personal contacts and 
media review. Interviewees suggested additional participants. Questions covered 
regional and transportation background, as well more specific information on projects‘ 
key supporters, opponents, challenges, and if and how supporters overcame such 
challenges. To triangulate and supplement interviews, I reviewed regional long-range 
transportation plans, Federal Transit Administration data, agency planning documents, 
organizational materials, and media coverage.  
Setting the Scene: Florida’s Department of Transportation, Miami, and Orlando  
Like other state DOTs, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) has 
expanded beyond roadways. State departments of transportation began as roadway 
agencies early in the twentieth century (Jones, 2008). After World War II, their 
capacity grew with the influx of funds for and control of interstate highway 
construction. Federal legislation, in 1991, required that states conduct multimodal 
planning and collaborate with metropolitan planning organizations, although the 
benefits of collaboration have generally emerged outside of the required planning 
processes (Taylor & Schweitzer, 2005). Along with its statewide multimodal 
                                                 
7
The larger research project on fast-growth regions is part of the Building Resilient Regions network, 
which the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation funds. Professor Juliet Gainsborough, of 
Bentley University, conducted the additional site visits and interviews. 
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transportation plan, FDOT formed a steering committee that recommended facilities 
for inclusion in the statewide strategic intermodal system (SIS). In 2003, the Florida 
legislature first adopted the SIS. The current strategic intermodal system includes 
roadways, freight and passenger railways, waterway shipping routes, intercity bus 
stations, passenger intermodal centers, and air, sea and space ports. Airports and 
seaports are important economically, as the state has a large tourist industry and goods 
movement economy. For example, the Miami International Airport serves as an 
international freight hub, with $34.5 billion in imports and exports passing through it 
in 2007 (FHWA, 2009). 
FDOT has evolved and partially devolved powers to metropolitan planning 
organizations, but still is a powerful agency with a roadway orientation. In its five-
year work plan, FDOT allocates eighty percent of its Strategic Intermodal System 
funds to roadway capacity (FDOT, 2010). Public transportation receives a substantial 
amount of funds in the work plan ($4.9 billion), but this is still less than fifteen percent 
of the total budget ($36.2 billion). FDOT still wields strong institutional power and 
controls larger amounts of money than other transportation agencies within Florida, 
but much of its planning and activities occur within its seven districts, each with a 
district secretary. Despite this decentralization, one interviewee commented, ―[o]f 
course, the major decisions still take place up in Tallahassee.‖  
Passenger rail has become a statewide issue in Florida. The Florida 
Department of Transportation will match local funds for intrametropolitan rail to help 
local sponsors secure money from the Federal Transit Administration. Currently, 
however, the only existing commuter and urban heavy rail lines are in metropolitan 
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Miami. FDOT support for rail may stem from its recognition that highway 
construction is insufficient for addressing congestion and other mobility challenges 
(Interviewees). Florida voters passed a referendum authorizing high-speed interurban 
rail in 2000. Governor Jeb Bush vetoed funding for it in 2003 and backed a successful 
ballot measure that repealed the original referendum. In the state house, commuter and 
high-speed rail have become contentious issues, as the SunRail case below shows.  
The Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) is the most populous in the state of Florida, with a population of 5.4 million 
(U.S. Census, 2008). The City of Miami and the South Florida region are traditional 
entry points for immigrants. A slight majority (56%) of the city‘s population is foreign 
born, and thirty-seven percent of the MSA‘s population is also foreign born (U.S. 
Census 2008). Miami and the entire region are home to a large share of Latinos (69% 
and 40%, respectively), especially Cubans who make up about one-third of Miami‘s 
population. Residents of Haitian origin also make up a sizable community (18, 309) in 
Miami (U.S. Census, 2000). Black residents account for almost twenty percent of the 
population in the city and MSA, as seen in Table 2. Miami and its MSA have lower 
household incomes and higher poverty rates than Central Florida, with poverty heavily 
concentrated in the City of Miami.  
    Total 
population 
Hispanic 
or Latino 
Non-
Hispanic 
white 
Non-
Hispanic 
black 
Median 
household 
income 
Individual 
poverty 
rate 
Foreign 
born 
Miami (city) 349,85 69% 11% 19%  $   29,151  26% 56% 
Miami MSA 5,403,075 39% 38% 19%  $    49,965  13% 37% 
Orlando (city) 222,245 22% 45% 27%  $    44,287  17% 17% 
Orlando MSA 2,025,729 22% 57% 14%  $    51,813  11% 16% 
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Table 3.2: Demographic profiles (American Community Survey, US Census Bureau, 2008). 
The Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan statistical area (MSA) has 
approximately two million residents, making it the third most populous in the state 
(following Miami and Tampa). The City of Orlando has a rather small population of 
222,245. Latinos, currently twenty-two percent of the population in the city and MSA, 
make up a growing share of residents, but have not achieved political representation to 
the extent Latinos in South Florida have. African Americans account for one-quarter 
of Orlando‘s population and just under fifteen percent of the MSA population.  
Case Studies 
Miami 
 AirportLink. 
The Florida Department of Transportation has been critical for the only rail 
project in metropolitan Miami‘s current, long-range plans. The 2.4-mile ―AirportLink‖ 
will travel from Miami‘s one Metrorail line (22 miles) to the Miami International 
Airport‘s intermodal center, now under construction. In addition to a central passenger 
terminal (with commuter rail, Amtrak and bus service), the intermodal center project 
includes a people mover to the airport, roadway improvements, and a rental car center. 
Local support for the Miami Intermodal Center (MIC) project is strong. ―That‘s been a 
project that‘s had pretty much local support,‖ said one stakeholder. ―I don‘t think that 
there‘s been any sort of opposition to it.‖  
FDOT became the sponsor of the intermodal center in the 1990s. Studies had 
found that an increase in airport capacity required increased ground transportation 
capacity (Interviewee), but the airport had little land. An off-site intermodal passenger 
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facility could increase the capacity of the Miami International Airport, one of the 
region‘s economic engines. After federal legislation in 1991 allowed more funding 
flexibility, Miami-Dade County asked FDOT to coordinate the Miami Intermodal 
Center (MIC). FDOT can draw on its greater capacity, experience with federal 
agencies, eminent domain powers, and influence on local partners, reasons given by 
interviewees for FDOT‘s leadership role.  
Metrorail service to the intermodal center will enhance ground 
transportation—and hence airport—capacity. In the mid-nineties, FDOT led a study of 
a Metrorail East-West
8
 line proposal that would have connected the MIC to 
downtown, the seaport, and the existing Metrorail line. Key stakeholders, including 
cruise ship lines concerned about passenger transfers and check-in logistics, had 
serious reservations about the proposal and the intermodal center (Interviewee). 
Furthermore, a 1999 sales tax referendum to fund transportation failed. Stakeholders 
began to consider a shorter line, which would branch off existing infrastructure (see 
Airport Link Figure 3.1
9
). 
                                                 
8
 I selected the North Corridor, discussed in the following section, rather than this East-West project, 
because the East-West project never formally re-entered the application process for federal funds after 
the North Corridor was identified as the highest implementation priority in 2002. 
9
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show maps with density breaks that match the density of housing units per hectare 
needed for different levels of bus service: 10 units/gross hectare for service of 20 buses daily;  17 
units/gross hectare for intermediate service; and at least 27 units/hectare for 120 or more buses per day  
(See Crewe and Forsyth, 2011). In Miami, the density of units may not reflect permanent residential 
density, due to second homes. Also, households are larger along the North Corridor areas, so population 
density differs from housing unit density.  
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Figure 3.1: Metrorail proposals. 
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A later referendum authorized a sales tax that will fund the short spur, now 
called the AirportLink. As part of a 2002 sales tax campaign, Miami-Dade County‘s 
mayor developed a ―People‘s Transportation Plan‖ (PTP), composed of the projects 
the proposed sales tax would fund. The spur from existing infrastructure to the 
intermodal center appeared in the PTP, although the plan listed other rail projects as 
higher priorities. Voters did approve this half-cent sales tax in 2002 for the PTP, with 
its ambitious list of service and infrastructure expansions. By that time, FDOT had 
already begun roadway construction for the airport‘s intermodal center 
(http://www.micdot.com/background.html).  
In 2004, the Secretary of FDOT, who is now Miami-Dade County‘s Aviation 
Director, committed $100 million for the Miami-Dade People‘s Transportation Plan. 
He specified, however, that this money would be for the rail spur between the 
intermodal center and the existing Metrorail (Abreu, 2004, February 24). By using 
only state and local funds, Miami-Dade Transit could avoid the lengthy federal 
application process for the AirportLink, but still seek federal funds for other projects. 
In April 2004, the Board of County Commissioners passed a resolution (R-424-04) 
that directed the county manager to work ―expeditiously‖ on the MIC connector, 
―while continuing aggressive efforts to obtain Federal funding for the North and East-
West Corridors.‖ At that time, AirportLink was to cost $260 million, using $160 
million of revenue from the PTP sales tax. Its cost has since increased to $526 million; 
the sales tax portion is now $426 million. Groundbreaking for the AirportLink 
occurred May 1, 2009 (http://www.miamidade.gov/transit/improve_airport.asp).  
FDOT has increased local implementation capacity by sponsoring the 
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intermodal center and partially funding the rail project that Miami-Dade Transit is 
building. Though not a direct sponsor of the rail component, FDOT is institutionally 
invested in all aspects of the MIC project. With the $100 million contribution to 
AirportLink soon after the PTP vote, it influenced which transit investment would be 
first (and now only). Thus, FDOT exercised influence on regional decisions. In effect, 
it drew an increasing amount of county dollars towards this particular investment. This 
depletion of funds is one of among several obstacles for the North Corridor Metrorail 
extension. 
North Corridor. 
North Corridor rail service would split off from Metrorail northwest of 
downtown to serve the majority-black communities in northern Miami-Dade County. 
The 9.5 mile extension would almost reach the Broward County line and serve a 
community college and Dolphin Stadium. Its most recent estimated cost is $1.6 
billion, with daily ridership of 22,600 projected for 2030 (see Table 3.1). It has earned 
a federal rating of ―medium‖ for cost-effectiveness, like most projects in the federal 
pipeline. 
North Corridor service was part of the original planning for Metrorail, but only 
one line of the envisioned network has materialized. From the perspective of some 
northern Dade residents, Latino leaders orchestrated the routing of the first (and only) 
Metrorail line to the majority-Latino City of Hialeah (community meeting). County 
officials, according to black leaders, promised North Corridor service during these 
routing decisions of the 1970s (Charite, 2008, May 7). Black voters supported bonds 
for Metrorail (Lebowitz, 2004, November 19), but even before it opened in 1984, 
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federal funds for additional lines appeared uncertain (Anderson, 1984, May 20). For 
years prior to the sales tax vote, Miami-Dade Transit lacked sufficient local revenue 
for major capital expansions.  
The People‘s Transportation Plan (PTP) and successful 2002 sales tax 
referendum offered promise for the North Corridor‘s implementation. In advance of 
the vote, County Commissioner Betty Ferguson, from northern Dade, pushed for the 
North Corridor to be the top priority: 
We were convinced as a community that if we supported the half penny 
sales tax that that extension would come to pass, [the] North Corridor 
as we‘re calling it. Because the half penny sales tax would support the 
build out of that extension. That is what we were told, that is what I 
was convinced – I was sitting on the commission at the time…I asked 
them to put that in writing, that the North Corridor extension would be 
the number one priority as to how that half-penny sales tax would be 
used for the Metrorail build out. They put it in writing. (Commissioner 
Ferguson at community meeting, December 12, 2009) 
  Despite a commission document that specifies the North Corridor as the top 
priority, subsequent decisions have left the North Corridor unfunded. Miami-Dade 
Transit and the county commission have directed money to the transit agency‘s new 
offices and delayed capital needs, including Metrorail car replacements, as well as the 
AirportLink project. Recognizing the transit agency‘s underfunded maintenance and 
operating needs, in March of 2009, the Board of County Commissioners voted to 
change the sales tax allocations. Instead of the tax supposedly funding service 
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expansions, now only ten percent is dedicated to expansion (Lebowitz, 2009, March 
4). With citizens angry about unfulfilled PTP promises, County Mayor Alvarez, 
elected in 2004, and other county officials held transit summits. They acknowledged 
the county‘s inability to implement the PTP (Lebowitz, 2008, November 16), in part 
because the plan‘s cost estimates are unrealistic (at least currently). 
The future for the North Corridor extension is unpromising. The Federal 
Transit Administration delayed its progress (FTA, 2009) and then stated the agency 
would remove it from the federal funding application process (FTA, 2010), because 
Miami-Dade Transit lacked sufficient operating funds. Miami-Dade Transit‘s most 
recent ten year plan (MDT, 2009) does not include any specific investments for the 
corridor. It states only that it will ―pursue incremental and affordable transit 
improvements…until heavy rail funding options are identified‖ (p. 9-2). The Miami-
Dade Metropolitan Planning Organization does not include the North Corridor in its 
twenty-five year plan (Gannett Fleming, 2009). 
FDOT has pledged resources for the North Corridor, contributing ―power to‖ 
the effort, but may have also marginalized its implementation. FDOT was to 
contribute $452 million (just under 30%) of capital costs through its New Starts 
program. In fact, FDOT‘s capital contribution would have been larger for the North 
Corridor than it is for AirportLink. The role of capacity contributions as ―power over,‖ 
however, is clearer when viewing these two projects together. The timing and 
constraints of FDOT‘s $100 million for the PTP advanced the AirportLink, not the 
projects prioritized in the PTP. Furthermore FDOT is sponsoring the intermodal 
center–without which there would not be this rail spur—and has a vested interest in 
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seeing implementation of all the MIC‘s elements. Since the AirportLink is absorbing 
an increasing amount of PTP funds and the dire fiscal condition of the transit agency 
has become apparent, little capacity remains locally to implement the North Corridor. 
The project has other barriers, such as critiques that it is not the most cost-effective 
project possible. Regardless, FDOT has contributed ―power to‖ both projects, but this 
state-level actor has exerted ―power over‖ regional action by partially determining 
which PTP project was implemented. 
Orlando 
Light-rail to International Drive. 
The Orlando-area transit agency and local elected officials led efforts for a 
light-rail line in the 1990s, with support from the Florida Department of 
Transportation. The Central Florida Transportation Authority, known as LYNX, 
received federal funds to design a light-rail system in 1996 (May, 2009). Local actors 
decided to start with a 14.6 mile segment from downtown Orlando to International 
Drive (I-Drive) (see Figure 3.2). I-Drive has large attractions (e.g. Universal Studios 
Theme Park and SeaWorld), as well as dining, lodging, and shopping establishments 
that have sprouted between downtown and Walt Disney World. Orlando Mayor 
Glenda Hood was a key champion for the project, along with Orange County Mayor 
Linda Chapin
10
 and Congressman John Mica.
11
  
                                                 
10
 At the time, Chapin was Chairperson of the Board of County Commissioners. The office is now titled 
County Mayor, and she retroactively has the title of Mayor. 
11
 Mica represents Florida‘s Seventh District that includes Flagler and St. John‘s Counties, as well as 
parts of Orange, Seminole, Volusia and Putnam Counties. This light-rail route would not have been 
within his district. 
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Figure 3.2: Orlando-area proposals. 
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Light-rail would have supported downtown revitalization, a high priority for 
Mayor Hood. Certainly downtown Orlando businesses would have benefitted from 
increased connectivity, with a forecast of 103,700 trips along the line each day (FTA, 
1999). Downtown businesses generally supported the proposal, but its benefits 
received less attention than the financing package (Interviewee) that included funds 
from Orlando, Orange County, FDOT, Universal Studios, and a special commercial 
tax district. 
I-Drive businesses had mixed reactions. While some major attractions 
supported the light-rail plan, many major businesses opposed it. At the time, both 
Universal and Disney World were building evening entertainment and dining districts 
to capture more visitor spending. According to Foglesong (2001), this put them in 
competition with downtown, thereby reducing potential support for tourist mobility 
via the light-rail project. Harris Rosen, the Orlando-based ―unofficial Mayor of I-
Drive‖ (Barker, 2000, November 26) and owner of five I-Drive hotels, judged the rail 
plan disruptive for business and without significant benefits. He maintains this 
assessment in retrospect: ―We fought very hard and defeated it. And we‘re a lot better 
off for having done that. It would not have done anything worthwhile‖ (Interview). He 
thus led the charge to halt the project, as did John Morgan, a liability attorney and 
owner of a small I-Drive attraction.  
Business opposition and a turn-over in the Orange County Board of 
Commissioners led the county to withdraw its funds from the project. After the 1998 
elections, the new county mayor and commissioners sought new financing 
arrangements and even raised the possibility of alternative light-rail projects. The 
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Federal Transit Administration pressured locals to maintain focus on the proposed line 
(Stratton, 1999, February 17 in Grovedahl, 2007). The city and county eventually 
forged a funding compromise, but it failed to pass on a 4-3 county commission vote. A 
commissioner, who previously had voted for the project, cast the critical negative vote, 
a position change interviewees attributed to the I-Drive opposition.  
Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood, with support of the city council, proposed a 
shortened segment within the city (approximately 7 miles). After discussions with 
FDOT, however, Hood too turned away from the project:  
I decided to go it alone with the city. And so the city commission 
supported that, and then we realized that other communities were 
quickly swooping in and going to grab those federal dollars…And of 
course, it would have been a shorter route, just within the city limits, 
and so then in conversation with the state DOT, we realized it was not 
the wisest thing to move forward. (Interview) 
The media described the final decision in a different light, with FDOT‘s rescission of 
funds triggering the project‘s demise:  
[S]tate Department of Transportation Secretary Tom Barry informed 
Hood on Friday that he was withdrawing $48.1 million tentatively set 
aside for light-rail, along with another $3.5 million for annual operating 
and maintenance expenses. Without that money, the city could not 
afford to carry on. Barry told Hood the plan had generated too much 
acrimony and precious little support. (Tracy & Stratton, 1999, 
December 4 in Grovdahl, 2007, p. 33) 
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FDOT‘s exact role is unclear, but it initially pledged critical resources, 
enhancing implementation capacity. It also assisted in planning activities; both 
contributions of ―power to.‖ Later FDOT withdrew funds for a shortened segment. 
Hood‘s insider account portrays the decision as collaborative, while the media 
presents FDOT‘s choice as unilateral. Regardless, the state influenced transit 
outcomes by withdrawing funds and/or advising Hood. FDOT thus exerted ―power 
over‖ locals by successfully encouraging them to abandon the project. 
After several failed initiatives, including the light-rail project and an Olympic 
bid, Central Florida leaders built support for increased regional cooperation at a 1999 
retreat. Following the retreat, myregion.org formed, under the umbrella of the Greater 
Orlando Chamber of Commerce, and formally partnered with the East Central Florida 
Regional Planning Council in 2001 
(http://myregion.org/Aboutimyregionorgi/ProjectHistory/tabid/63/Default.aspx). In 
2006 and 2007, myregion.org led extensive outreach to craft a regional vision, in 
cooperation with the Florida Department of Community Affairs, FDOT, the Central 
Florida MPO Alliance, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council, and the 
Orlando Regional Chamber of Commerce. The effort emphasized the negative 
outcomes of current growth trends, such as sprawl and congested roadways. The 
resulting regional concept plan, How shall we grow?, proposes concentrated growth 
and more transportation options, with ―4 C‘s‖ as organizing ideas: centers, corridors, 
conservation and countryside. The notable regional consensus around this voluntary 
effort (21 of 86 municipalities in the region have modified their comprehensive plans 
 83 
 
to align with it) may have contributed to the broad-based support of the SunRail 
project, discussed in the following sections. 
SunRail. 
A republican congressman built early interest in an Orlando commuter rail 
project, although state actors would become essential. About six months after the final 
vote on light-rail, Congressman Mica began to promote a commuter rail project. Mica, 
whose district includes some northern Orlando suburbs, had put the idea on hold to 
support the light-rail initiative (Interviewee). In 2000, he suggested commuter rail 
could run within three years (Oldham, 2000, February 6 in Grovdahl, 2007), using 
existing rail infrastructure that a freight operator owned. The thirty-one mile 
commuter rail project, dubbed SunRail, will connect suburbs north of Orlando in 
Orange, Seminole, and Volusia Counties to Orlando‘s central business district. Low 
ridership projections for 2030 (7,400 daily boardings) contribute to the project‘s 
medium-low cost-effectiveness rating (FTA, 2008). Due to LYNX‘s unfavorable 
public image after the light-rail project failed, local leaders asked FDOT to sponsor 
the project (Interviewees). 
SunRail soon became the region‘s rail priority. Regional visioning had built 
cooperation and support for transportation alternatives to the automobile. As a 
member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (and its chair as of 
January 2011), Mica could help reserve federal funds for it. A civic leader noted that 
SunRail became the transit project of choice almost by happenstance: ―What I want to 
say is that whether we would sit here having been around all of this and said let‘s do a 
commuter rail route versus a light-rail and what makes sense and everything—that 
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debate died away because of the circumstances‖ (Interviewee). As the feasibility, 
unity, and resources for the project grew, local players saw it as the one project to 
support for the regional good, a starting ―spine‖ for rail in a region without any and a 
vision that depends on it. 
Business support for SunRail is wide-ranging, including Walt Disney World, 
Darden Restaurants,
12
 two major hospitals and the Orlando Magic. The Magic even 
purchased 5,000 SunRail pins and promoted the project during basketball game 
announcements (Kassab, 2009, April 24). Most business support was less direct, 
relying on lobbyists and business organizations, specifically the Central Florida 
Partnership (which runs the chamber of commerce) and the Metro Orlando Economic 
Development Commission (Kassab).  
To implement commuter rail, FDOT needed access to a rail corridor that 
travels north-south and through downtown Orlando. CSX, which owns the track, is a 
large freight operator with national headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida. FDOT 
reached a purchase agreement with CSX, but the liability provisions required approval 
from the state legislature. Initially CSX‘s ownership appeared to be an obstacle, but its 
involvement may explain FDOT‘s commitment to the project.  
The state has an economic development rationale for supporting CSX‘s freight 
plans and purchasing the track. For some years, CSX had been considering shifting its 
freight traffic slightly to the west and building an intermodal logistics center. Their 
plan would move most freight off the downtown Orlando corridor. The freight would 
                                                 
12
 Darden Restaurants is one of the few Fortune 500 companies with headquarters in Central Florida. 
Among other brands, Darden owns Olive Garden, Longhorn Steakhouse and Red Lobster. 
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travel to a logistics center in Winter Haven (outside of Mica‘s district and to the west 
of Orlando), where CSX predicts creating 8,000 jobs (Decamp, 2008, March 16). 
Governor Jeb Bush‘s administration actively sought a deal with CSX (Peterson, 2007, 
November 30), with an initial agreement announced in August 2006. Currently the 
deal is slated for $641 million (Laing, 2010, June 26). It includes purchase of sixty-
one miles of CSX track—allowing for future commuter rail south of Orlando—and 
major infrastructure improvements for the alternate track and logistics center. It allows 
CSX to use the rail FDOT is purchasing and liability provisions for when it does.  
The need for legislative approval (of the liability provisions) made project 
critics at the state-level prominent. As even some supporters acknowledge, the project 
is costly and offers only modest direct benefits, except to CSX. State Senator Paula 
Dockery (R, Lakeland) led opposition, concerned by the cost of the project, the deal‘s 
secrecy, benefits to CSX, and the increased freight traffic her hometown will 
experience (Interviewee). According to some interviewees, she really opposed the 
project for personal reasons. Jeb Bush was behind the CSX deal, and Doc Dockery 
(her husband) had spearheaded the high-speed rail efforts that Bush killed. Some 
fiscally conservative legislators opposed the project because of its high cost, up to $1.2 
billion,
13
 and the state‘s commitment to fund operating costs for seven years.  
Project supporters failed to secure needed legislative approval in the 2008 and 
2009 legislative sessions, despite increased efforts in 2009. Elected officials from 
                                                 
13
 Some news articles report the project‘s cost as $1.2 billion. These estimates add the CSX deal ($641 
million) and the actual project cost for stations, rolling stock, etc. ($600 million) (Kassab, 2009, April 
24; Laing, 2010, May 26). The actual track purchase within deal is $150 million (FDOT, 2008), making 
$750 million another potential cost figure. The most recent FTA evaluations of the project‘s cost-
effectiveness use a lower projected capital cost (FTA, 2010). 
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Central Florida lobbied in Tallahassee, notably State Senator Lee Constantine (R, parts 
of Seminole and Orange counties) and Mayors Dyer (D, Orlando) and Crotty (R, 
Orange County). Trying to win votes from South Florida legislators, supporters added 
funding for South Florida‘s commuter rail line to the 2009 SunRail bill. It still failed 
to pass. By this time, FDOT had expended significant funds on rights-of-way and paid 
out $44 million to contractors, including $941,000 for public relations, of which 
myregion.org received $266,000 (Garcia & Deslatte, 2009, June 11). With FDOT-
funded infrastructure improvements uncertain and the economic downturn, CSX 
announced a delay in its plans for the logistics center in May 2009 (Palmer, 2009, May 
8). 
SunRail did pass at a special legislative session in December 2009, when it 
became intertwined with high-speed rail funding. Florida was seeking federal stimulus 
funds for a $2.6 billion high-speed rail segment, and competition for the federal 
dollars was fierce. In October 2009, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood 
explained Florida‘s high-speed rail application had potential, but that the state must 
sustain its metropolitan and local transit systems (Tracy, Hafenbrack & Deslatte, 2009, 
December 9). This trigged a special legislative session and a new bill. The successful 
bill authorized SunRail, had slightly modified liability measures, created a statewide 
rail authority, and directed $15 million annually to South Florida‘s commuter rail 
service. A legislative staffer explained this different approach: 
[LaHood] said that without a commitment from the state, without a 
commitment to rail transit, Florida does not stand a chance on getting 
the 2.5 or 2.6 billion dollars in high-speed rail funds. So what 
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transpired was really a metamorphosis in the thought process in 
Tallahassee. We were like, ―Well, we need to get our act together‖…So 
how is it different? It‘s different because it‘s not a regional piece of 
legislation—this is a statewide piece of legislation.  
As for the Miami projects, FDOT contributed capacity, or ―power to,‖ for both 
of these Orlando projects. It offered some institutional support for the light-rail, but 
the level of support it provides for SunRail dwarfs that support. FDOT negotiated 
purchase of the corridor, committed capital and operating funds, and sponsors the 
project—tremendous contributions of financial and institutional ―power to.‖ It is 
unclear how much FDOT‘s support hinges on a desire to support the freight industry 
or enable regional goals and partnerships.  
Examples of ―power over‖ are both direct and indirect through the 
prioritization of SunRail. Of course, the state legislature exerted some ―power over‖ 
local implementation by delaying, although ultimately approving, the liability 
provisions for SunRail. FDOT exerted ―power over‖ directly on the I-Drive project 
through withdrawing funds and encouraging the project‘s termination. Perhaps more 
importantly, FDOT‘s contribution of resources, coupled with Mica‘s advocacy, made 
SunRail the transit project moving forward in the region. FDOT and Mica effectively 
exerted influence over regional choices by advancing this project in an environment 
where local players believed they needed regional unity. Despite low ridership 
projections, local visionaries see SunRail as an initial step towards a transformed 
region with improved transit. The election of a new, fiscally conservative governor in 
2010 appears to present new implementation challenges for SunRail, but these events 
 88 
 
are still unfolding. Ironically, the federal funding that triggered the special session will 
not come to Florida, due to the new governor‘s stance on the high-speed rail project. 
Discussion 
In this section, I describe the conditions of and outcomes for the cases through 
the lens of ―power to,‖ including the conditions common to the projects for which 
FDOT plays a larger institutional role. Then, I interpret state action as ―power over,‖ 
at the project and regional level. I conclude the discussion section by identifying the 
potential significance for new regionalism. 
For each project, state-level actors enhanced collective ―power to‖ implement 
projects, through contributions of financial and/or institutional capacity. FDOT 
pledged millions towards the capital costs of all four rail projects, and is an 
institutional leader role for two projects. FDOT‘s sponsorship of the intermodal center 
enables the possibility of the AirportLink in Miami and ensures the center‘s 
components advance. FDOT‘s institutional role is most significant for SunRail. It 
sponsors the project, will provide seven years of operating funds, and brokered the 
track purchase. 
SunRail and AirportLink, for which FDOT has a sponsorship role, differ from 
the other projects in two ways. First, these projects benefit from regional consensus 
that the projects are desirable and important; broad agreement behind the other 
projects was lacking. Supporters have mobilized extensively for SunRail, but the I-
Drive project was contentious. The intermodal center and AirportLink have not 
prompted visible mobilization in South Florida, but interviewees frequently noted the 
importance of ports in the regional economy. Furthermore, there has not been 
 89 
 
opposition. Though the North Corridor Metrorail extension has not been contentious, 
it lacks support outside its service corridor. 
Second, AirportLink and SunRail have economic significance beyond their 
corridors. Central Florida leaders describe SunRail‘s potential to transform 
metropolitan growth patterns and enhance the region‘s competiveness. Regardless of 
this envisioned transformation, the project is intertwined with freight movement in 
Florida. The state, especially under the leadership of Jeb Bush, sought to facilitate 
CSX‘s plan to reroute rail traffic and build a logistics center. Likewise, AirportLink 
will expand the capacity of an airport that serves not just traveling locals, but a 
recreational tourist economy, international business travel, and freight movement. 
Florida‘s Strategic Intermodal System includes the CSX tracks involved in the 
SunRail deal and the Miami International Airport; it will include the airport 
intermodal center upon completion.  
The two projects that benefitted from increased FDOT institutional 
sponsorship are those poised for implementation. FDOT contributed some financial 
capacity but less institutional involvement to the two projects that appear terminated, 
the I-Drive light-rail and Miami‘s North Corridor. Economic significance and regional 
consensus were the common conditions for the state‘s institutional contribution of 
―power to.‖ In these cases, state institutional leadership acts as an important 
mechanism that increases ―power to‖ and the likelihood of implementation. FDOT 
sponsorship in turn strengthens regional consensus, for example by funding SunRail‘s 
public promotion, earmarking funds for the MIC rail link, and shepherding local 
partners responsible for various aspects of the MIC project. Figure 3.3 below depicts 
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the relationship between project dynamics, state institutional leadership and outcomes 
for these cases. 
 
Figure 3.3: Diagram of projects with state sponsorship. 
At the project-level, state actors can also exert ―power over.‖ One obvious 
example of FDOT‘s exercise of ―power over‖ local outcomes is when its withdrawal 
of funds triggered the demise of the I-Drive project. The most obvious instance of 
state-level ―power over‖ is the legislature‘s obstruction of SunRail, even as another 
state-level actor (FDOT) was enabling it. Ultimately though, federal control of high-
speed rail money led to the legislature‘s assent. Perhaps at the project level, state 
actors exert influence by choosing the extent to which they mobilize institutional 
capacity; a higher degree of state-level mobilization increases the likelihood of 
implementation. 
Seeing FDOT‘s ―power over‖ regional choices, however, is easier when 
FDOT 
institutional 
sponsorship
Implemented
Regional 
consensus
Economic 
significance
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considering projects in conjunction. At the regional level, state actors‘ ―power over‖ is 
mainly through selecting where to most mobilize ―power to‖ and implications from 
such choices, as summarized in Table 3.3. In South Florida, FDOT‘s earmarked and 
early contribution to AirportLink effectively prioritized this investment for the region, 
rather than the People‘s Transportation Plan‘s higher priority projects. The county will 
now spend almost half a billion dollars on AirportLink, reducing PTP funds available 
for other expansions. Certainly the North Corridor has other implementation 
challenges, but FDOT‘s and other capacity mobilized for another rail expansion has 
limited local financial capacity for pursuing the North Corridor.  
 
Table 3.3: Case summaries. 
 
―Power to‖ 
(state actors) 
―Power to‖ 
explanation 
―Power 
over‖ (state 
actors) 
―Power over‖ 
explanation  Outcome 
North 
Corridor 
(Miami) 
Some; 
Financial 
only 
Would have matched 
local funds ($452.72 
of $1.6 billion) 
Some Earmarked funds for 
AirportLink; 
effectively 
prioritizing it over 
this extension 
Not in ten-year 
transit plan or 
twenty-five year 
transportation 
plan 
AirportLink
(Miami) 
Substantial; 
Financial and 
indirectly 
institutional 
$100 million (of $426 
million) directly for 
AirportLink; 
sponsoring 
intermodal center 
(only new stop) 
Some/ 
substantial 
Earmarked funds for 
AirportLink; 
effectively 
prioritizing it over 
other investments 
Under 
construction 
I-Drive 
light-rail 
(Orlando) 
Substantial; 
Financial and 
planning 
support 
Helped planning, 
would have 
contributed 
substantial funds 
($135 of $600 
million; 1998 costs) 
Some Withdrew 
funds/encouraged 
City of Orlando to 
halt project after 
Orange County vote 
Terminated 
SunRail 
(Orlando) 
Most 
substantial; 
Financial and 
institutional 
CSX track purchase 
& infrastructure 
improvements ($491 
million); Project 
sponsor; Capital 
($104 of $416 
million) and 
operating expenses  
Substantial Legislature delayed 
and almost halted 
project; early 
negotiations made 
this the key regional 
project 
Poised for 
implementation 
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In Central Florida, FDOT sponsors the commuter rail project. Its institutional 
support, Representative Mica‘s advocacy, and local concern for regional unity stunted 
debate about other possibilities. This ―power over‖ regional decision making 
foreclosed other transit projects as potential priorities for implementation. FDOT has 
even allocated funds for public relations, though these efforts are to promote SunRail, 
not directly discredit other ideas.  
Findings from these case studies indicate potential directions for new 
regionalism and urban governance research. First, the critical role of state-level actors 
in these cases strengthens the call to better incorporate analysis of higher tiers of 
government in regional research. Even though some research has indicated a role for 
the state, a new framework for incorporating complex roles and higher tiers may be 
needed. Second, my use of a dual lens for power also provides a new way to look at 
the capacity focus of new regionalism and governance literature. While the literature 
has largely failed to consider inequalities of power, this lens allows me to identify 
capacity, unequal degrees of influence, and how the two are intertwined.  
Conclusion 
Through analysis of four projects, this research has examined the role of state-
level actors in transit implementation. State-level actors pledged important financial 
resources, but FDOT only sometimes took an institutional leadership role. The two 
projects poised for implementation are those that FDOT helped sponsor but also those 
which have more regional consensus and economic significance. For governance and 
implementation research more broadly, these case studies suggest that state-level 
actors can be important governance participants in building collective ―power to,‖ but 
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that as they do so, they almost inevitably exert ―power over.‖ Federal actors, as well, 
appeared in case studies as exerting ―power over‖ regional outcomes, and the federal 
role certainly merits more investigation. The exercise of ―power over‖ through 
selective contributions to capacity suggests that new regionalism and urban 
governance studies should consider how and for what cooperation emerges. While 
planners in transportation practice may find the state‘s dominant role self-evident, 
these literatures have not sufficiently explored the expanding state role in multimodal 
systems and intrametropolitan transit.  
In addition to expanding research beyond these cases, research can further 
examine multiple dimensions of power within regions and in relation to political-
economic context. This research has focused on state actors, but the cases suggest the 
importance of critical analysis of horizontal (within region) power in governance. For 
example, the contention over light-rail in Orlando indicates ―power over‖ and conflict 
remain central in horizontal, regional arenas and thus merit attention. Further research 
on capacity building could draw on critiques of network governance (Hadjimichalis & 
Hudson, 2006; Moulaert & Cabaret 2006; Reckhow & Lester 2007) to explore how 
agenda setting, coalition participation and existing inequities exclude some 
possibilities and players—exerting ―power over‖—while still building regional 
capacity.  
Finally, economic context and policy influence the goals of regional 
governance coalitions. The instances in which the state department of transportation 
had greater institutional investment were those with more economic significance. This 
is not surprising, but brings to light the larger macroeconomic motivations of 
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stakeholders in cooperative implementation that may be glossed over in conversations 
emphasizing the shared interests of collaborators. New regionalism and governance 
literature need more analysis of how policy and economic factors influence the targets 
for which governance actors mobilize capacity, especially since the emphasis on 
governance has blurred normative and analytic approaches to coalitions and capacity.  
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CHAPTER 4: Federal Transit Funding, Politics and Local Factors 
Abstract  
Despite the billions of dollars that the federal government has invested in mass transit, 
its funding role in transit expansion is understudied. Currently, most of its 
contributions to rail expansion are through its New Starts program. Despite the 
program’s formal evaluation of project benefits and local financial commitment, I 
hypothesized that national political clout and metropolitan characteristics would affect 
projects’ success in the program. Regression results indicate that a project’s local 
financial commitment rating correlates with whether it reaches a grant agreement and 
its benefits rating correlates with how quickly it does so. I found little statistical 
evidence that national political factors and most metropolitan attributes correlate with 
outcomes. Case profiles and statistical findings on local financial commitment indicate 
a significant role for local context and funding dynamics. Local financial commitment 
ratings might thus be an outcome of and proxy for the local political will behind 
projects. Changing the criteria for project benefits evaluations may have limited 
impact due to the importance of local funding.  
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Federal policies and programs have dramatically shaped metropolitan 
landscapes in the United States, as the interstate highways that cross metropolitan 
regions visibly demonstrate. Accounts of transportation finance (Beimborn & Puentes, 
2005; Taylor, 2004) and histories of minority neighborhoods (Mohl, 1993) identify 
mechanisms in the interstate program’s design that contributed to current development 
and transportation patterns. The federal role in mass transit infrastructure and its 
subsequent impact on urban environments has received less attention. Since the 
federal government authorized capital grants in 1964 (Jones, 2008), however, federal 
funds have been critical for most major, mass transit infrastructure expansions. In 
2005, major transportation legislation (SAFETEA-LU) authorized $6.6 billion for 
transit expansion through the federal New Starts program 
(http://www.fta.dot.gov/planning/newstarts/planning_environment_2607.html). In this 
program, project sponsors must navigate a multi-step application process in which the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) evaluates projects using justification (benefits) 
and financial criteria.  
This analysis identifies to what extent national political clout, metropolitan 
characteristics, and project evaluation criteria correlate with success in the New Starts 
(NS) program. I define success as reaching a grant agreement with the FTA and doing 
so relatively quickly. Based on the political science literature, I hypothesized that 
political clout and metropolitan demand factors would correlate with funding 
outcomes, but found limited correlation between these factors and whether projects 
were funded. I did find a significant correlation between local financial commitment 
and funding outcomes. Increased project benefits, as captured in a ―justification‖ 
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rating, did correlate with success in moving through the process more rapidly. Brief 
profiles of four exceptional cases show the importance of project context and factors 
beyond the FTA’s current control. I argue that these findings do not indicate a non-
existent federal role but rather one in which the rules of the game privilege local 
sustained capacity, rather than projects that maximize benefits and best support 
national priorities. 
The New Starts Program and Federal Funding 
According to Beimborn and Puentes (2005), transit competes with highways 
on an uneven ―playing field‖ for funding. Historically, the United States Department 
of Transportation has contributed a smaller share to transit capital projects than 
highways, and, unlike highways, it awards transit expansion funds competitively. 
Even though transit requires a larger local share than the interstate program did, there 
are still incentives for expansion: federal funds can still seem to be largesse from 
above and infrastructure is thought to create jobs (Taylor & Samples, 2002). 
The New Starts program is the Federal Transit Administration’s major 
program for funding rail and other fixed guideway
14
 transit expansion. The FTA 
distributes most funds via a formula ($4.1 billion in FY 2009), but the New Starts 
program provides substantial additional funds ($1.8 billion in FY 2009)
15
 through a 
competitive and sometimes lengthy process. Through New Starts, the FTA may fund 
up to 80 percent of project costs, although the FTA prefers that projects request a 
smaller federal share.
.
Currently, many more projects are in the pipeline than the FTA 
                                                 
14
 A guideway (e.g. a catenary system) or an exclusive right of way makes transit service ―fixed 
guideway.‖ Rail is fixed guideway, and bus rapid transit with special right-of-way can qualify as fixed 
guideway (New Starts Working Group, 2009, Appendix A). 
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will be able to fund (GAO, 2007).  
To receive New Starts funds, project sponsors must complete a multi-stage 
application process, with three critical decision points. Local agencies must conduct 
comprehensive transportation ―systems planning‖ and ―alternatives analysis‖ for 
specific corridors, before seeking FTA authorization for a selected project to enter into 
―preliminary engineering‖ (PE), the first stage in the official pipeline. In my analysis, 
funded projects spent a mean of 4.7 years in the pipeline. The second milestone is 
authorization from the FTA to enter final design (FD), the next stage in the pipeline. 
Finally, if successful, the project’s sponsor and the FTA will sign a full funding grant 
agreement (FFGA) in which the FTA commits to seek congressional appropriations 
for the project (see Figure 4.1). New Starts project authorizations appear in the major 
transportation bills that Congress passes approximately every five years, but Congress 
must later appropriate funds for each project.  
                                                                                                                                            
15
 http://www.fta.dot.gov/funding/apportionments/grants_financing_9562.html 
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Figure 4.1: New Starts application process, shaded portions indicate the official NS pipeline 
(Adapted from GAO, 2007, p. 9). 
 
The FTA annually evaluates projects in the New Starts pipeline (the shaded 
portion in Figure 4.1) and reports these ratings to Congress as part of its funding 
recommendations. A project’s overall rating is the equal combination of categorical 
ratings for ―local financial commitment‖ and ―project justification,‖ the latter 
approximating benefits. The FTA rates financial commitment based on the share of 
local funds for the project (preferring projects that request a smaller share from the 
program), the strength of the capital funding program, and the operating funding plan 
(the long-term fiscal capacity of the project’s operator with an expanded system). The 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) defined criteria for 
the FTA’s evaluation of project justification or benefits: cost-effectiveness, operating 
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efficiencies, land use, mobility improvements, and environmental benefits. Later 
legislation (SAFETEA-LU) added economic development as a criterion (GAO, 2008). 
Though Congress mandated the justification criteria, the FTA has repeatedly 
modified the specific measures and weights for criteria. For example, prior to the mid-
2000s, the FTA used capital cost per new transit rider (a rider who had shifted from a 
different mode of transportation) as the measure for cost-effectiveness. This 
disadvantaged projects along corridors and from metropolitan areas with high transit 
use. Now, the agency uses hours of transportation system user benefits (TSUB) in the 
calculation of cost-effectiveness. Some claim this measure does not capture all the 
benefits of a transit investment (GAO, 2008), and its calculation is based on numerous 
assumptions about the future. The Government Accountability Office (2007) has 
identified the New Starts evaluation process as a model for other programs, due to its 
formal process and specific measures. Despite this exemplary evaluation system, I 
hypothesized that national political and local capacity variables would still affect 
funding outcomes.  
Politics and Federal Funding 
Political analysis of rail investment has tended to examine whether investment 
choices align with stated goals. Ridership projections—an underlying piece of the 
rationale to build rail—have historically overestimated ridership (Flyvbjerg, 2007; 
Laverny-Rafter, 2010) but have improved somewhat (FTA with Vanasse Hangen 
Brustlin, 2008). In an analysis of the NS program, Chen (2007) attributes inaccurate 
estimates of costs and benefits to a principal-agent problem. The NS program’s 
structure allows the interests of the local sponsor (the agent) to differ from the 
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interests of the federal government (the principal). At the metropolitan or local level, 
rail routes are sometimes selected not for their maximum contribution to official goals 
but for their political (Taylor, Kim & Gahbauer, 2009) or technical (Cohen-
Blankshtain & Feitelson, 2011) feasibility.  
There is limited analysis of federal transit capital spending in the United 
States. Emerson (2002) provides descriptive information on projects funded by the 
New Starts program and notes that the number of projects in the pipeline exceeds 
demand. He also finds that most NS funds go to very large metropolitan areas. 
Brown’s (2003) analysis of the allocation of highway and transit funds is likely the 
most comprehensive study of federal transportation spending. Brown finds significant 
relationships between total earmarked transit capital dollars received by each state and 
total state population, percentage of urban population, and whether the state had 
members on two critical House committees. Political variables have limited 
significance, however, on a per capita basis. His analysis considers change over time 
by comparing three different years but does not compare spending over multiple years. 
Limited existing studies and Brown’s interesting but inconclusive results suggest that 
further study of transit capital funding is warranted. To consider federal rail spending, 
I turn to the political science literature that has used ―supply‖ and ―demand‖ factors to 
explain allocation patterns. 
In supply-side studies, federal funds represent a ―supply‖ of money that 
politicians and officials seek to use to their advantage. According to this framework, 
legislators will direct funding toward their districts to secure voter allegiance, a 
practice commonly known as ―pork barrel‖ spending. Some studies have found 
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significant relationships between congressional committee memberships, which enable 
legislators to direct funds, and federal spending (Carsey & Rundquist, 1999). Senate 
and House committee memberships may have different effects (Brown, 2003; 
Gamkhar & Ali, 2007; Lauderdale, 2008). Similarly, allocations at the state level may 
be part of presidential election strategies (Gamkhar & Ali, 2007; Larcinese, Rizzo, & 
Testa, 2006). Lowry and Potoski (2004) argue, however, that empirical evidence is 
mixed on whether federal expenditures reflect officials’ attempts to use the ―supply‖ 
of money to their advantage.  
―Demand‖-side analysis looks at the characteristics of constituents and 
recipients, with a wide range of potential actors and measures. Lowry and Potoski 
(2004) assert that organized interests are a critical factor of demand. They measure 
organized interests as tax-exempt organizations, private establishments, and the 
number of local governments. Across seven policy areas, they find at least one 
measure of organized interests had a significant relationship with the discretionary 
grants received by a state. Inter-local cooperative agreements are another measure of 
constituent demand and capacity. Such agreements show significant correlation with 
the number of grants received by a metropolitan statistical area, even when accounting 
for population (Bickers & Stein, 2004). 
To better understand federal transit funding, I examine the influence of 
national political factors, constituent characteristics, and federal criteria on projects’ 
success in the New Starts pipeline. I examine two aspects of success: whether project 
sponsors reach grant agreements with the FTA and how quickly they do so. Informed 
by the political science literature, I incorporate variables for supply-side national 
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political factors and demand-side factors, like metropolitan population. I also consider 
FTA ratings and criteria effects. I build on Brown’s (2003) analysis through focusing 
on one program throughout a twelve-year period, exploring additional variables, and 
considering funding at a scale more appropriate to transit capital funding—the 
urbanized area. 
Methodology 
I primarily adopted statistical methods to understand the federal New Starts 
program. A multi-year analysis was necessary, since projects take years to move 
through the pipeline.
16
 FTA data collection and retention has improved in recent years, 
but the agency still lacks comprehensive, centralized information on proposed and 
funded projects (GAO, 2009). Information since the late 1990s is more available and 
consistent, and so I study projects that the FTA rated for fiscal years 1998 to 2011. To 
limit analysis to major and comparable investments, I excluded the small projects that 
are exempt from FTA ratings (those requesting less than $25 million) and those in the 
new Small Starts program (for projects under $250 million with less than $75 million 
in NS funds). In this section, I discuss dependent variables, independent variables, 
statistical methods, and the case profiles. 
Variables 
I consider two aspects of success: reaching grant agreements and speed 
through the pipeline. Successful projects are those that resulted in full funding grant 
agreements with the FTA. Among successful (funded) projects, I define less time 
                                                 
16
 The average time for a project to progress from alternatives analysis (a stage prior to the FTA‘s 
oversight) to a full funding grant agreement is ten years (New Starts Working Group, 2009). Among the 
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spent in the pipeline as more successful. Thus, I use two dependent variables as 
measures of a project’s success in the New Starts program: 1) whether a project 
reached a grant agreement (a categorical variable) and 2) the length of time (in years) 
it took to do so, as seen in Table 4.1. Based on the political science literature, I 
expected that increased political clout, a supply-side factor, and measures of 
metropolitan demand and capacity would correlate with increased success. The FTA 
has designed a process with great attention to project merits and local financial 
commitment, and thus I anticipated that to some extent higher FTA ratings would 
correlate with increased likelihood of funding and quicker progression in the program.  
  
                                                                                                                                            
projects I analyzed, the mean time in the official pipeline (from entry into preliminary engineering to 
reaching a full funding grant agreement) was 4.7 years (n=38). 
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Dependent variables Measure Success N Min. Max. Mean Model 
Reached a grant 
agreement 
Categorical 1 60 0 1 .65 Binomial logistic 
regression 
Time in pipeline Years in 
pipeline  
Fewer 38 0.6 10.5 4.7 Linear regression  
Table 4.1: Dependent variables and methods. 
 I used three independent variables for supply-side factors or federal political 
clout. I summed the number of times that the state, where a project was located, was a 
swing state in presidential elections (2000, 2004, and 2008), given the correlation 
between swing-state status and increased discretionary highway spending (Gamkhar & 
Ali, 2007). For each urbanized area, I calculated the leadership appointments held by 
congresspersons on eight key committees
17
 during the 105
th
 to 111
th
 Congresses. I 
assigned a value of one for appointments as a chair or ranking member during each 
session and one-half for a few listings of vice-chairs. Because the Senate and House of 
Representatives can have different effects on federal spending (Brown, 2003; 
Lauderdale, 2008), I tallied leadership appointments by each chamber separately, 
thereby generating two independent variables, as seen in Table 4.2. 
 Comprehensive measures of multi-sectoral and multi-jurisdictional governance 
do not exist, and so I experimented with several measures for demand that I expected 
to correlate with success. I included the total population of urbanized areas to indicate 
latent demand, due to Emerson’s (2002) finding on NS funds and large metropolitan 
                                                 
17
 Senate committees included in the analysis were: the Appropriations Committee; the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development; the Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee; and the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. Leadership appointments 
from the following House Committees were included: the Appropriations Committee; the 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related 
Agencies; the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee; and the Subcommittee on Highways and 
Transit. Leadership data is accessible via the Congressional Directory 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cdirectory/index.html). 
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areas. I also expected widespread transit system usage, measured by the share of 
commuters using transit (2000 census data), would indicate greater demand. On the 
other hand, I expected urbanized areas with fragmented transportation agencies to 
have less capacity to seek funds. Thus, I included the total number of metropolitan 
planning organizations and transit providers per urbanized area, expecting that to 
indicate less demand and correlate with less success. 
Independent variables Min.  Max. Mean Anticipated 
effect 
Supply-side: national political 
clout 
        
House appointments 0 3.5 .4 + 
Senate appointments 0 7 .9 + 
Swing-state status 0 2 .4 + 
Demand-side: metropolitan 
characteristics/capacity 
        
Transit providers 1 39 8.4 - 
MPOs 1 5 1.4 - 
Share of commuters using transit 1.4% 29.0% 7.6% + 
UZA population  541,175  17,800,238  4,419,108  + 
Project characteristics         
First justification rating 1 4 2.3 + 
First financial rating 0 4 2.1 + 
Last justification rating 1 4 2.4 + 
Last financial rating 0 4 2.3 + 
Capital cost (in millions) $ 97   $ 8,371   $ 1,054  - 
New Starts share of costs 0% 80% 52% - 
Cost/projected rider  
(in millions) 
 $ 3,109   $ 110,872   $ 34,200  - 
Table 4.2: Independent variables and anticipated effects. 
 Finally, I included independent variables based on FTA criteria, anticipating at 
least some correlation. Project justification and financial criteria ratings are based on 
FTA categorical ratings transformed into ordinal rankings.
18
 I included the ratings for 
project justification and local financial commitment, which equally compose the 
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project’s overall rating. As project’s move through the pipeline, ratings change and 
thus I included both first (when available) and last ratings. Among the unfunded 
projects, the FTA’s last ratings sometimes were incomplete or seemed to reflect an 
existing decision to terminate the project. Therefore I used the penultimate ratings for 
unfunded projects. In addition to the categorical ratings, I suspected some particular 
criteria had especially significant relationships to the dependent variables and included 
them. The FTA measure for cost-effectiveness changed during the study period, and 
so I calculated and used a different proxy: the ratio of the project’s total cost (adjusted 
to 2009 dollars using a producer price index) to the long-term (approximately twenty-
year) projected daily ridership. Because of the increasing emphasis on local match, I 
included the share of total costs the project sponsor sought from the NS program. I 
also anticipated that more costly projects would tend to be less successful and 
included total capital cost (adjusted to 2009 dollars). All project data is from the 
FTA’s annual reports to Congress.19 
Methods 
I used binomial regressions, nonparametric tests, and cross tabulations to 
identify factors that correlated with whether projects reached a grant agreement, my 
first measure of success. In most of my analysis, I excluded three outliers that sought a 
zero percent share of NS funds. These projects were by definition ineligible for a full 
funding grant agreement, as they did not actually seek funds. First, I compared how 
                                                                                                                                            
18
There have been some shifts in categories, but generally I quantified the categorical ratings as follows: 
Low=0; Medium-low=1; Medium=2; Medium-high=3; High=4. 
19
 These reports are available online 
(http://www.fta.dot.gov/planning/newstarts/planning_environment_2618.html). The annual report for 
 114 
 
independent variables differed between the funded and unfunded categories. I used 
standard t tests to compare the difference in means for the two independent variables 
with normal distributions (New Starts share of costs and cost per projected rider). For 
variables without normal distributions, I used Mann-Whitney U scores, which when 
significant disprove the null hypothesis that the distribution of independent variables 
is the same in the two groups. The Mann-Whitney U score is not a test of difference 
between means, but, like the t test, can indicate the distribution of values differs across 
categories. Second, I employed a binomial logistic regression to model how 
independent variables might together correlate with outcomes. I present two models: 
one with all proposed variables and a second, more parsimonious model.
20
 Third, I 
also provide cross tabulation tables to show how ratings might act as thresholds, even 
if not predictors.  
Among funded projects, I used linear regression to model how factors correlate 
with the time a project took in the pipeline, my second measure of success. I present 
two models, one with all variables and a second, more parsimonious model.
21
 I also 
                                                                                                                                            
FY 1999 is not available online nor was it easily accessible in the FTA‘s office. Because almost all 
projects appear in multiple years, this omission is unlikely to affect results.  
20
 I retained measures that had statistically significance correlations in the first binomial regression or 
had a significant Mann-Whitney U score. In my revised binomial regression, I removed the 
congressional clout measures but retained the swing-state measure, given the limits to the congressional 
proxies and potentially more important role of presidents. I removed the total population, speculating 
Emerson‘s finding on large metropolitan areas may have been due to large metros having higher transit 
usage. I excluded the organizational proxies for metropolitan capacity (MPOs and transit agencies), as 
they were only experimental. I removed the NS share and cost per predicted rider, as these measures 
should be incorporated into project ratings. Also, I anticipated that ultimate ratings were more important 
than initial ratings for funding outcomes and excluded the latter. 
21
 I retained senatorial appointments, given their significant correlation, but excluded the other demand-
side variables. I used the same metropolitan factor as the previous parsimonious model (transit 
commute share). Because first ratings might have a greater effect on the time taken to advance and 
showed significant correlations, I used first and not last project ratings. Finally, even as the New Starts 
share should be incorporated into the financial rating, its significant correlation (albeit in the 
unanticipated direction) led me to retain it in the second linear model. 
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calculated correlations between independent variables and successful projects’ time in 
the pipeline; I used Spearman’s correlation coefficients due to the non-normal 
distributions of most variables. 
Following the statistical results, I provide brief profiles of four outlying cases. 
These profiles supplement models that have some explanatory power but may raise 
rather than answer questions. The case profiles draw primarily on FTA evaluations, 
but I supplement the reviews with news media and other materials. 
Results 
Success at Reaching a Grant Agreement 
Statistical tests provided limited evidence of a relationship between reaching a 
grant agreement and most variables. Only one demand-side variable, the share of 
commuters using transit, and one project variable, the last financial rating, had robust 
results indicating a relationship with reaching a grant agreement. Results did not 
consistently show a robust relationship between grant agreements and any supply-side 
variables. Beyond the robust results for transit commute share and financial rating, 
several variables had significant Mann-Whitney U scores. In this section, I discuss 
results from Mann-Whitney tests of distribution, binomial regressions, and tabulations 
of outcome by project ratings. 
Statistical tests did not show a significant difference between funded and 
unfunded projects for most variables. Table 4.3 includes the means and medians of 
each independent variable and indicates whether there is a statistically meaningful 
difference in distributions across the two outcome categories. Among supply-side 
measures of political clout, only the swing-state score had a Mann-Whitney U score 
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that indicated a significant difference in the distribution of the variable (For Mann-
Whitney results, see Appendix II). Interestingly, the average swing-state status was 
lower among funded projects, not higher as anticipated. Among metropolitan 
characteristics, only the share of commuters using transit had a Mann-Whitney U 
score that indicated significant difference in the distributions across the two 
categories. Among project characteristics, first financial rating, last financial rating, 
and total capital cost had Mann-Whitney U scores that indicated statistically 
significant difference in the distribution across the two categories.   
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Table 4.3: Independent variables by outcome. *Indicates a Mann-Whitney U score 
significant at the .1 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level. 
 
The first binomial logistic regression (Model 1) included all independent 
variables. It had a modest goodness of fit score (Cox and Snell R square score=.463), 
but correctly predicted 87 percent of project outcomes, as seen in Table 4.4. The 
Variable  Outcome N Mean Median 
House appointments No GA 18 .33 .0 
  Grant agreement 39 .49 .0 
Senate appointments No GA 17 .71 .0 
  Grant agreement 38 .97 .0 
Swing-state status* No GA 17 .76 1.0 
  Grant agreement 38 .34 .0 
Transit providers No GA 18 5.67 4.0 
  Grant agreement 39 9.46 5.0 
MPOs No GA 18 1.61 1.0 
  Grant agreement 39 1.31 1.0 
Share of commuters 
using transit** 
No GA 18 5.0% 3.6% 
  Grant agreement 39 8.9% 7.3% 
UZA population No GA 18 3,261,013             1,782,393           
  Grant agreement 39      4,816,397 2,674,996 
First justification 
rating 
No GA 18 2.22 2 
  Grant agreement 39 2.33 2 
First financial rating* No GA 18 1.78 2 
  Grant agreement 39 2.26 2 
Last justification 
rating 
No GA 18 2.33 2 
  Grant agreement 39 2.44 2 
Last financial 
rating*** 
No GA 18 1.61 2 
  Grant agreement 39 2.67 3 
Capital cost (in 
millions)** 
No GA 18 
$ 1,174 $ 970.4 
  Grant agreement 39 $  1,038                    543.2 
New Starts share of 
cost 
No GA 18 52% 50% 
  Grant agreement 39 56% 55% 
Cost/projected rider
 
 No GA 18 $ 37,573 $ 36,432 
 Grant agreement 39 $ 34,174 $ 31,946 
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model predicted funded projects (the majority) more accurately than unfunded projects 
(92 % versus 76%). Only two variables had significant coefficients, as seen in Table 
4.5. The coefficient for a project’s last financial rating was in the anticipated direction 
and significant at the .05 level. For every category increase in its last financial rating, a 
project’s score would increase by 3.1. The share of population using transit for 
commuting had a significant coefficient at the .1 level, likewise in the anticipated 
direction. Its coefficient of 42.5 indicates that for a one percent increase in the transit 
share of commuting the prediction score would increase by .4. 
Observed  
Reached grant agreement 
Predicted 
Reached GA Percentage 
Correct No Yes 
 No (0) 13 4 76.5 
Yes (1) 3 35 92.1 
Overall Percentage   87.3 
Table 4.4: Model 1 predictions (The cut value is .500). 
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Table 4.5: Coefficient results for binomial models. *Indicates significance at the .1 
level; **Indicates significance at the .05 level. 
 
 
Model 1: 
Coefficient 
Model 1: 
Sig. 
Model 2: 
Coefficient 
Model 2:  
Sig. 
 House leadership appointments -.204 .729   
Senate leadership appointments .061 .836   
Swing-state status sum .854 .361 -.009 .989 
Transit providers in UZA .150 .651   
Metropolitan planning 
organizations 
-.286 .637   
Share of residents commuting 
by transit 
42.478* .080* 28.939* .065* 
Urbanized area population .000 .697   
First justification rating -.025 .984   
First financial rating -.222 .707   
Last justification rating -.733 .533 -.538 .504 
Last financial rating 3.139** .005** 2.616** .003** 
Capital cost (in millions, 2009 
dollars) 
-.001 .170 -.001 .192 
New Starts share of cost 5.360 .203   
Cost/projected rider .000 .192   
Constant -9.641 .033 -4.866 .054 
A more parsimonious model (Model 2) yielded a slightly weaker goodness of 
fit score (Cox & Snell R square .415) and predictive ability for unfunded projects (11 
of 17), as seen in Table 4.6. The same variables had coefficients with statistical 
significance at the same levels, as Table 4.5 shows: last financial rating (at the .05 
level) and share of transit-riding commuters (at the .1 level). Again these variables 
were in the anticipated direction. Among the variables without statistical significance, 
the swing-state count and last justification scores were in the unanticipated direction, 
as they correlated with decreased rather than increased likelihood of success. The total 
cost (in 2009 millions of dollars) had the anticipated effect—more costly projects were 
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predicted to be less likely to reach grant agreements—but the coefficient did not have 
significance. In Table 4.7 below, I have provided an example project and show how 
each variable would affect the predicted likelihood of reaching a grant agreement. 
Observed  
Reached grant agreement 
Predicted 
Reached GA Percentage 
Correct No Yes 
 No (0) 11 6 64.7 
Yes (1) 3 35 92.1 
Overall Percentage   83.6 
Table 4.6: Model 2 predictions (The cut value is .500).  
  Example 
value 
Coefficient Variable effect on 
predicted score 
Swing-state status 1 -.009 0.0 
Share of commuters using transit 5% 28.9 1.4 
Total capital cost (in millions, 2009 
dollars) 
1,000 -.001 -1.0 
Last justification rating (ordinal) 1 -0.5 -0.5 
Last financial rating (ordinal) 2 2.6 5.2 
Constant     -4.9 
Predicted value  
(.5 cutoff)  
   
 Predicted 
                         0.3 
unfunded 
Table 4.7: Example predicted project outcome. 
Findings thus are inconclusive for most variables. Findings are robust for the 
transit commute share, a demand variable, and last financial rating, a project variable, 
indicating a potential relationship between funding and those variables. Other 
variables had limited statistical findings. Mann-Whitney U scores indicated a 
difference in the distribution of independent variables for one supply-side variable, 
swing-state status, and two additional project variables, first financing rating and 
capital cost.  
Simple cross tabulations of funded and unfunded projects (Table 4.8) show 
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that no projects with financial rating scores below medium (2) reached grant 
agreements. I also include a cross tabulation for final justification scores, even as 
increased justification scores did not have significant results. Like last financial scores, 
only projects with scores of medium reached agreements. This matches the program’s 
evaluation design; it appears that obtaining medium ratings is necessary but not 
sufficient for reaching grant agreements. 
Last financial rating 
 
 
 
Unfunded Funded Total  
Low (0) 2  0 2 
Medium-low (1) 5 0 5 
Medium (2) 11 15 26 
Medium-high (3) 3 22 25 
High (4)  0 2 2 
 
  
 
  
Total 21 39 60 
  Last justification rating 
 
 
 
Unfunded Funded Total
Low (0) 0 0 0 
Medium-low (1) 1  0 1 
Medium (2) 13 25 38 
Medium-high (3) 7 11 18 
High (4)  0 3 3 
 
  
 
  
Total 21 39 60 
Table 4.8: Last ratings by outcomes (includes three outlier cases). 
Success as Less Time in the New Starts Pipeline 
Among funded projects, correlation and modeling results did not indicate a 
strong relationship between length of time in the pipeline and most variables. Results 
did consistently show a significant effect for two variables, both project related: a 
project’s first justification rating and the share of its funding from New Starts, the 
latter in the opposite direction expected (that is those with more funding were 
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quicker). Several other variables (Senate leadership appointments, transit commute 
share, and first financial ratings) sometimes had significant relationships with the time 
variable, but the remaining variables had no significant relationships. Because the 
dependent variable is years a project was in the pipeline, negative relationships 
(correlation and coefficients) indicate increased success (reduced time). In this section, 
I discuss Spearman’s correlation coefficients and then linear regression results.  
Several independent variables had significant (Spearman’s) correlations with 
the dependent variable, as shown in Table 4.9. Increases in a project’s first 
justification rating and NS share had a significant relationship with reduced time in the 
pipeline at the .05 level. The New Starts correlation is in the unanticipated direction, 
as I anticipated asking for a lower share of funds would correlate with success (as 
reduced time). At the .1 level, a project’s first financial rating correlated with reduced 
time and thus increased success. Also at the .1 level, the count of Senate leadership 
appointments was significant, but in the opposite direction anticipated. More 
senatorial leadership appointments correlated with increased time.  
  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig.  
  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig.  
House appointments .081 .627 First justification rating -.356 .028** 
Senate appointments .279 .094* First financial rating -.291 .077* 
Swing-state status .005 .975 Last justification rating .067 .690 
Transit providers .220 .185 Last financial rating -.116 .486 
MPOs -.164 .326 Capital cost  .142 .395 
Share of residents 
commuting by transit 
.168 .313 New Starts share of 
cost 
-.380 .018** 
UZA population .112 .505 Capital cost/rider .041 .808 
Table 4.9: Spearman’s correlation between years in pipeline and independent variables. 
*Indicates significance at the .1 level; **Indicates significance at the .05 level. 
 
The F statistic for linear Model 3, with all independent variables, indicated 
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significance at the .01 level. Its adjusted R square was more moderate, as seen in 
Table 4.10. Table 4.11 displays the coefficients for both models. Two project variables 
had significant coefficients: first justification score (at the .01 level) and the NS share 
of costs (at the .05 level). Increases in both are associated with decreased time and 
increased success. Thus, an increased share for NS had the unanticipated effect of 
increased speed in the pipeline. An increase of one point (category) in the first 
justification score results in reduction of 2.3 predicted years in the pipeline. An 
increase of 10 percent (.1) in the NS share correlated with a reduction of 7.6 years in 
the predicted time in the pipeline.  
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
F Sig. 
Model 3 .448 3.091 .009 
Model 4 .414 6.096 .000 
Table 4.10: Models 3 & 4 goodness of fit scores. 
 
A more parsimonious regression (Model 4), based on correlation scores and 
exclusions discussed in the methodology, also yielded an F statistic significant at the 
.01 level. It had a slightly lower adjusted R square (.414), as seen in Table 4.10. All 
variables in this regression, however, had significant coefficients, as Table 4.10 
shows. Again, the first justification rating had the anticipated effect, and the NS share 
had an unanticipated effect. Increased senatorial leadership appointments and public 
transit shares had unanticipated effects; as these increased, so did time in the pipeline. 
Table 4.12 uses possible values for each variable to demonstrate the predicted time in 
the pipeline according to Model 4. The predicted value, 5.4 years, would place the 
hypothetical project in the third quartile for speed, thus slower than the median. 
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Table 4.11: Linear regression coefficients. *Indicates a significance at the .1 level, ** at the 
.05 level, and *** at the .01 level. 
 
  
Example 
value Coefficient 
Variable effect on 
predicted result (yrs) 
Senate appointments  1 0.3 0.3 
Share of residents 
commuting by transit 
5% 7.3 0.4 
First justification rating 2 -1.7 -3.4 
First financial rating 2 -0.7 -1.3 
New Starts share of 
costs 
50% -4.8 -2.4 
Constant     11.8 
  Predicted  time (yrs) 5.4 
Table 4.12: Example project application. 
 
  
 Model 3: 
Coefficients 
Model 3: 
Significance 
Model 4: 
Coefficients 
Model 4: 
Significance 
 (Constant) 14.814*** .000*** 11.802*** .000*** 
House leadership appointments -.068 .862   
Senate leadership appointments .367 .194 .328 .090* 
Swing-state status sum -1.180 .149   
Transit providers (in UZA) -.099 .727   
Metropolitan planning 
organizations (in UZA) 
-1.219 .207   
Share of residents commuting by 
transit 
20.506 .174 7.314 .082* 
Urbanized area population 1.823E-8 .969   
First justification rating -2.329*** .003*** -1.677*** .002*** 
First financial rating -.359 .401 -.666 .054* 
Last justification rating 1.242 .111   
Last financial rating -.669 .278   
Capital cost (in millions, 2009 
dollars) 
.000 .404   
New Starts share of cost -7.610* .010* -4.827 .016** 
Cost/projected rider 2.177E-6 .904   
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Project Profiles 
Statistical analysis does not provide evidence for most hypothesized factors 
and therefore raises questions about what other factors may have relationships with 
funding outcomes. Given the inconclusive results, small dataset, and experimental 
proxies, next I provide brief case profiles of four exceptional cases. The profiled 
projects are: a highly rated but unfunded project, a project requesting a zero percent 
New Starts share, the funded project that was in the pipeline for the longest amount of 
time (10.5 years), and the funded project that moved most quickly through the 
pipeline.  
High ratings, unfunded. 
 Four unfunded projects had first and last financial scores with the equivalent of 
a medium high-rating (3). Among these, the Central Florida light-rail project had the 
highest averaged first and last justification score (3), so I review why this highly rated 
project failed to result in a full funding grant agreement. 
The area’s transit operator, LYNX, sponsored a light-rail proposal to connect 
downtown Orlando and the tourist corridor, adjacent to Walt Disney World in Orange 
County, Florida. The Orlando mayor led efforts to implement the line in the late 
nineties, but some high profile tourist businesses opposed the project. After a change 
in the Orange County Commission’s leadership, the commission voted (4 to 3) to 
withdraw its funding for the project. As a result, the Florida Department of 
Transportation withdrew its funds, and the Orlando mayor also abandoned the project 
(Grovdahl, 2007). Put simply, the failure to reach a full funding grant agreement was 
due to the demise of the sponsor’s partnership and funding 1999, not FTA actions. 
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Zero funding requests. 
Three projects had final funding plans proposing a zero percent New Starts 
share. All three had average first and last justification scores equivalent to medium (2). 
Among them, the project with the highest financial ratings was the proposal for a 
light-rail line from downtown Houston to the Astrodome (7.5 miles). The FTA’s 
profile for fiscal year 2001 (FTA, 2000) included a substantial NS share, but the 
subsequent profile’s financial plan (FTA, 2001) had a zero percent NS contribution. 
Congressional action seems to account for this shift. Representative Tom DeLay, a 
staunch opponent of light-rail transit from suburban Houston, inserted a provision into 
federal legislation restricting the area from receiving federal funds for this project 
(Mason, 2001). Using a dedicated county sales tax, the county transit agency was able 
to build the line without New Starts funds.  
At first glance, it seems odd that the county transit agency would expend 
resources to keep the project in the federal pipeline, but it may have had a longer-term 
strategy. In fact, later federal legislation directed the US Secretary of Transportation to 
consider the $324 million, already expended for the Astrodome line, as a local 
contribution for future NS projects. By including these funds, the local (non-New 
Starts) share for the proposed Houston North Corridor Line is higher (FTA 2010, p. A-
94).  
Slowest in the pipeline and low ratings. 
Among the projects that reached grant agreements, a Norfolk light-rail project 
took the most time in the pipeline (10.5 years). In addition, it and the University 
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extension in Salt Lake City had average financial commitment ratings equivalent to 
medium-low (1), the lowest among funded projects. Despite some poor FTA ratings, 
the FTA issued a grant agreement for the Norfolk project. 
The original proposal was for an eighteen-mile light-rail line connecting 
downtown Norfolk to the Oceanfront in Virginia Beach. The 1999 FTA evaluation 
indicated local funding for the project was not secure (FTA, 1999 [FY 2000]). Soon 
thereafter (1999), Virginia Beach voters rejected a funding mechanism, and the project 
scope was reduced to a seven-mile line within Norfolk. Subsequent projections for 
ridership fell from just over 14,000 riders daily to around 7,000 (FTA [FY 2009], 
2008). The project’s sponsor also changed, from the Tidewater Transportation District 
Commission to Hampton Roads Transit. Before reaching a grant agreement, the city 
approved rules limiting downtown parking, a condition underlying ridership estimates 
(FTA 2008 [FY 2009], p.A-63) and project benefits.  
Quickest project through pipeline. 
A double-tracking commuter rail project in South Florida moved most quickly 
through the New Starts pipeline. From its official entry into preliminary engineering, it 
took about seven months to reach a grant agreement in 2000. The project had a 
medium-high (3) first justification rating. Only one project received the highest 
possible score for justification (high/4) in its first evaluation. The project may have 
enjoyed elite support, a demand-side factor. Regional business leaders used the need 
to secure federal allocations for the project, which already had a grant agreement, as 
rationale for reorganizing the commuter rail operator (Alpert, Gainsborough &Wallis, 
2006).  
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Project characteristics align with anticipated outcomes and some statistical 
data. The moderate to high ratings of the project match statistical data (especially the 
correlation of first justification rating with time) and anticipated positive relationships 
between success and ratings. The project requested a relatively small share of New 
Starts funds (33%) versus the mean of 56 percent for all funded projects. Only four 
projects asked for a smaller share. While an increased New Starts share correlated 
with decreased time in statistical results, this case study follows my anticipated logic 
of small shares correlating with quicker timelines. The project’s total cost was $459.7 
million (in 2009 dollars), less than half the mean for funded projects ($1,038 million). 
The cost of projects did not show a statistically meaningful relationship with time in 
the pipeline, but I had anticipated less expensive projects would be more successful.  
Discussion 
 Statistical findings provide little support for most of my hypothesized variables 
but indicate local funding dynamics have a robust relationship with federal funding 
patterns. Case profiles support this finding and provide examples of local dynamics 
that are beyond the FTA’s control but affect federal funding patterns. In this section, I 
describe three main findings: the limited evidence for political factors and most 
metropolitan proxies, the importance of local dynamics, and the qualified effects of 
program evaluation. I then discuss implications for the federal program’s structure. 
 First, I found very limited evidence of a systematic relationship between 
success and political factors and most metropolitan proxies. No supply-side variables 
demonstrated a consistently significant relationship between national political factors 
and funding outcomes or pipeline progress. Swing-state status and senatorial 
 129 
 
appointments yielded some significant results for project outcome and speed, 
respectively, as seen in Table 4.12 below. As variables did not consistently show 
significant effects or relationships, I cannot conclude that political supply-side factors 
are influential. Furthermore, senatorial appointments had the opposite effect 
anticipated. These null findings for supply-side factors could be due to insufficient 
proxies, an inaccurate hypothesis, or the challenges of a small dataset. In fact, despite 
strong conceptual reasoning for supply-side factors, the Houston rail case profile even 
includes a politician obstructing the flow of federal funds to his region.  
 Evidence on metropolitan demand factors does not support a demand-side role, 
except for the share of commuters using transit. Other proxies of metropolitan capacity 
did not have any significant relationships, but they were experimental. Nonetheless, 
the share of transit commuters had robust and significant results for funding outcomes 
and sometimes a relationship with time in the pipeline. Furthermore, inter-
jurisdictional dynamics around funding in the case profiles suggest that metropolitan 
dynamics and ―demand‖ or political will might be important. Perhaps other proxies 
would capture a systematic effect, but a useful proxy may not exist, as the case 
profiles present such varied metropolitan effects.  
  Supply-side Demand-side Project factors 
Funding outcome Swing-state status  Transit share of 
commuters 
Last financial rating 
First financial rating 
Capital cost 
Time in pipeline Senate 
appointments 
Transit share of 
commuters 
First justification rating 
NS share of cost 
First financial rating 
Table 4.13: Statistical findings of significance. Bold indicates multiple findings of 
significance. 
 
 Even with limited findings on demand-side proxies, local funding has a strong 
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relationship with project outcomes, as a demand-side analysis (Bickers & Stein, 2004; 
Lowry & Potoski, 2004) would predict. Statistical analysis revealed a robust 
relationship between ratings for local financial commitment, one component of local 
dynamics, and whether a project reached a grant agreement. I classified local financial 
commitment rating as a project variable, but it is also an outcome of local funding 
agreements. Case profiles suggest the importance of local dynamics in project 
outcomes, as the collapse of funding partnerships in Orlando and Norfolk terminated 
and delayed projects, respectively. Project termination, as detailed in the Orlando 
profile, is largely beyond the FTA’s control. Given these dynamics, perhaps local 
financial commitment is best conceived of as an indicator and outcome of local 
political will behind projects. It, more than any other variable, has a strong 
relationship with actualized patterns of federal funding. 
 Third, findings show a mixed relationship between federal evaluation and 
funding outcomes. A project’s last financial rating consistently showed a statistically 
significant coefficient in models of whether a project reached a grant agreement. The 
relationship was as anticipated—an increased rating correlated with an increased 
probability score for reaching a grant agreement, but it could reflect local political will 
more than federal decisions. On the other hand, a project’s initial justification score 
showed a significant relationship with its speed in the pipeline. It appears that projects 
thought to provide more benefits reached agreements more quickly, if they did reach 
grant agreements. This should encourage those who hope for a criteria-based process. 
The NS share consistently had a significant relationship with success in quickly 
moving through the pipeline, but in the unanticipated direction. Despite officially 
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favoring projects with lower NS shares, increased shares of NS funds correlated with 
quicker movement through the pipeline.  
 Project profiles and the limited effects of project ratings and criteria suggest a 
limit to the FTA’s influence. As discussed in the introduction to the NS program, the 
FTA depends on locals to conceive of, prioritize, and implement projects. High 
justification scores, suggesting substantial project benefits, do not correlate with 
whether a project is funded, but cross tabulations show they may represent a threshold 
for grant agreements. Project benefits, as captured in justification ratings, do correlate 
with a project’s time in the pipeline. A project’s final rating for financial commitment 
has the strongest relationship with whether a project is funded. This could be due to 
the FTA’s program design and the importance it gives to ratings and/or this rating 
could be an outcome of the strong local political will behind a project’s 
implementation.  
 The importance of local dynamics and funding commitments may have 
practical implications. The FTA has a strong rationale for emphasizing local financial 
commitment. The agency can fund more projects if it does so at lower shares. The 
agency seeks to ensure that the projects it funds do not divert critical operating funds 
from existing services. At least as important, financial criteria help ensure that project 
sponsors will be able to fund the operating costs for the proposed infrastructure. This 
emphasis and the pipeline’s structure, however, reward project supporters that can 
raise funds and sustain applications, not necessarily those advancing the most 
beneficial services for environmental, economic, or equity goals. Some metropolitan 
areas, where resources are most limited and needs are greatest, may be excluded 
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inadvertently. The program’s emphasis on financial commitment, along with the ban 
on federal operating subsidies for large metros, disadvantages large, older systems that 
have higher operating and maintenance demands but serve the most riders. 
Furthermore, within metropolitan areas, leaders may back some projects more than 
others. As a result, local funds may be secured for some projects, while other projects 
that may better serve national transportation goals never make it to the application 
stage.  
Conclusion 
 Transit infrastructure investment shapes metropolitan areas, and federal 
funding enables many such investments through its New Starts program. To date, 
studies have focused on inaccurate ridership estimates more than the federal role in 
and pattern of investment. I hypothesized that national political clout, metropolitan 
demand, and project characteristics affect federal funding outcomes.  
 Statistical analysis of success in the New Starts pipeline indicated that FTA 
ratings for financial commitment and project justification affect success in different 
ways. I measured success as whether sponsors reached a grant agreement and how 
long they took to do so. I considered supply- and demand-side variables, as well as 
project characteristics. Statistical analysis indicated significant relationships between 
reaching a grant agreement and a project’s last financial rating and the share of 
commuters using transit in the urbanized area. The time a project took, however, 
showed a stronger relationship to a project’s first justification rating and the share of 
funds requested from the New Starts program. Other proxies did not show robust 
relationships to success. 
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 Statistical findings, in combination with the four profiles, point to tentative 
findings and raise important questions for future research. First, findings suggest the 
importance of local dynamics that are hard to capture. A project’s financial rating may 
be an outcome and effective proxy for local political will. I find little indication of 
supply-side factors, commonly referred to as pork barrel politics, and mixed effects of 
program evaluation. Local financial commitment ratings appear to have the strongest 
relationship to reaching a grant agreement, and justification ratings appear to have the 
strongest relationship to speed. These measures may represent thresholds, but the 
effective emphasis on local political support could disadvantage metropolitan areas 
with existing, extensive transit systems. Given the limited role of project justification 
ratings beyond a threshold and primacy of local dynamics, marginal improvements in 
the accuracy of ridership projections or changing weights and measures for criteria are 
unlikely to shift funding patterns in the near term. Further research could examine 
whether projects that do not make it into the official pipeline would fare differently, 
explore new proxies for metropolitan demand, and consider the effects of and possible 
changes in program funding structure. 
  
 134 
 
References 
Alpert, L., Gainsborough, J., & Wallis, A. (2006). Building the capacity to act 
regionally: Formation of the Regional Transportation Authority in South Florida. 
Urban Affairs Review 42(2), 143-168.  
 
Beimborn, E,, & Puentes, R. (2005). Highways and transit: Leveling the playing field 
in federal transportation policy. In Taking the high road: A metropolitan agenda for 
transportation reform, Katz, B. & Puentes, R. (eds.) Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 257-285. 
 
Bickers, K.N., & Stein, R.M. (2004). Interlocal cooperation and the distribution of 
federal grant awards. The Journal of Politics, 66(3), 800-822. 
 
Brown, J. (2003). The numbers game: The politics of the federal surface 
transportation program. Dissertation. Los Angeles, CA: University of California, Los 
Angeles.  
 
Carsey, T. M., & Rundquist, B. (1999). Party and committee in distributive politics: 
Evidence from defense spending. The Journal of Politics, 61(4), 1156-1169.  
 
Chen, W. (2007). Analysis of rail transit projection selection bias with an incentive 
approach. Planning Theory, 6(1) 69-94. 
Cohen-Blankshtain, G., & Feitelson, E. (2011). Light rail routing: Do goals matter? 
Transportation, 38, (2), 343-361. 
Emerson, D. (2002). FTA New Starts: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
Act of 1991 and Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century funding 
commitments. Transportation Research Record, 1799, 72-77. 
 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Office of Planning and Environment with 
support from Vanasse Hangen Brustlin, Inc. (2008). Predicted and actual impacts of 
New Starts Projects-2007: Capital cost and ridership. Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Transportation. 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (1999). Annual report on New Starts: Proposed 
allocation of funds for fiscal year 2000. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Transportation. 
 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (2000). Annual report on New Starts: Proposed 
allocation of funds for fiscal year 2001. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Transportation. 
 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (2001). Annual report on New Starts: Proposed 
allocation of funds for fiscal year 2002. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
 135 
 
Transportation. 
 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (2008). Annual report on New Starts: Proposed 
allocation of funds for fiscal year 2009. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Transportation.  
Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (2010). Annual report on New Starts: Proposed 
allocation of funds for fiscal year 2011. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Transportation. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2007) Policy and planning for large-infrastructure projects: Problems, 
causes, cures. Environment and Planning B, 34, 578-597. 
 
Gamkhar, S. & Ali, H. (2007). Political economy of grant allocations: The case of 
federal highway demonstration grants. Publius, 38(1), 1-21. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2007) Public transportation: Future 
demand is likely for New Starts and Small Starts programs, but improvements needed 
to the Small Starts application process. GAO-07-917. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2008). Public transportation: 
Improvements Are Needed to More Fully Assess Predicted Impacts of New Starts 
Projects. GAO-08-844. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009). Public transportation: Better data 
needed to assess length of New Starts process, and options exist to expedite project 
development. GAO-09-784. Washington, DC: Author.  
 
Grovdahl, D.L. (2007). Headlines: A chronology of passenger rail proposals in Central 
Florida through media headlines and story excerpts. Orlando, FL: Metroplan Orlando. 
 
Jones, D. W. (2008). Mass motorization + mass transit: An American history and 
policy analysis. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.  
 
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L., & Testa, C. (2006). Allocating the U.S. federal budget to the 
states: The impact of the president. The Journal of Politics, 68(2), 447-456.  
 
Lauderdale, B. (2008). Pass the pork: Measuring legislator shares in Congress. 
Political Analysis, 16, 235-249.  
 
Laverny-Rafter, D. (2010). Federally-mandated evaluation of New Starts transit 
projects. Journal of Public Transportation, 13(3), 65-77.  
 
Lowry, R.C. & Potoski, M. (2004). Organized interests and the politics of federal 
discretionary grants. The Journal of Politics, 66(2), 513-533. 
 136 
 
Mason, J. (2001, August 2). Legislation aims to free rail funding / Deal hinges on 
voter approval of projects. The Houston Chronicle, p. 25 Metfront. 
 
Mohl, R. A. (1993). Race and space in the modern city: Interstate-95 and the black 
community in Miami. In Hirsch, A. R. & Mohl, R. A. (eds.), Urban policy in 
twentieth-century America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 100–158. 
 
New Starts Working Group. (2009). The New Starts congressional handbook. Jeff 
Booth (Holland & Knight, LLP), Chair. Accessed July 23, 2009  
http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/public/display_asset/2009newstartshandbookpdf 
 
Taylor, B.D., Kim, E.J. & Gahbauer, J.E. (2009). The thin red line: A case study of 
political influence on transportation planning practice. Journal of Planning Education 
and Research, 29(2), 173-193. 
 
Taylor, B.D. & Samples, K. (2002.). Jobs, jobs, jobs: Political perceptions, economic 
reality, and capital bias in U.S. transit subsidy policy. Public Works Management & 
Policy, 6(4), 250-263.  
 
Taylor, B.D. (2004). The geography of urban transportation finance. In The geography 
of urban transportation, Hanson, S. & Giuliano, G. (eds.). New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press, 3-29. 
  
 137 
 
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
 
Each preceding paper addresses the subject of transit implementation from a 
different perspective. In the introduction, I describe Orlando’s pending commuter rail 
project, SunRail. The project is exemplary of many of the questions around 
implementation, multi-sector action, regional futures, and equity that motivate this 
body of research. In the first paper, I discuss decision making processes outside of 
MPO planning that bypass it but determine transit investment. The MPO process 
responds to, rather than determines, transit implementation choices in my cases. 
Because of intergovernmental context, federal directives for equity in planning appear 
insufficient. In Boston and Miami, rail investments proposed for low-income and 
minority communities advanced through mobilization targeting the county level in 
Miami and the state level in Boston.  
Next, I examine the state role in the implementation of four projects in Miami 
and Orlando. The Florida Department of Transportation took a larger institutional role 
for projects that have economic significance and regional consensus behind them. I 
argue that by selectively contributing capacity, ―power to,‖ state actors exert ―power 
over‖ regional outcomes. I suggest that new regionalism might benefit from an altered 
concept of capacity building that considers what capacity is mobilized for and the 
multiple levels of government that act in metropolitan regions. 
Finally, my third paper presents a quantitative analysis of the federal New 
Starts program. Statistical results show a robust relationship between local financial 
commitment and federal funding. Cross tabulations demonstrate that all funded 
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projects met a minimum threshold of benefits. Relatively more beneficial projects 
reached grant agreements quicker, but higher justification ratings do not correlate with 
an increased likelihood of receiving funding. Case profiles indicated that numerous 
and variable local conditions affect outcomes, demonstrating the challenge of finding 
appropriate metropolitan proxies. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I consider these papers in relationship to the 
broader questions I raised in the introduction and then identify practical implications 
for rethinking the role of metropolitan planning organizations and transit investment. 
Findings suggest several answers to how regionally significant action happens—not 
simply through planning nor easily, but instead through significant mobilization of 
capacity and through established government entities. I propose Altshuler and 
Luberoff’s (2003) ―bottom-up‖ federalism as a useful frame to describe how the 
powerful federal role responds to action at smaller scales. The importance of local 
initiative and mobilization contributes to the appeal of governance as a policy and 
normative category. However, findings indicate the need to further develop 
governance as an analytic category that incorporates multiple types of power and 
spheres of action. I find that equity does not fare as well in implementation as in plans, 
due in part to the challenges of implementation and mobilization. I then identify 
potential options to strengthen or alter the role of metropolitan planning organizations. 
I conclude with reflections on making the ideal rail deal. Political will, behind 
infrastructure investment, may be an opportunity to connect rail infrastructure to 
critical environmental and equity interventions, such as changes in land use policy and 
federal operating assistance for transit. 
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Action, Intergovernmental Relationships, and Equity 
How Does Significant Action Happen Across Jurisdictions? 
First, cooperative and voluntary regional planning alone did not result in 
significant action toward implementation in this study. Proposed transit projects are 
often unimplemented, even when part of official, regional, long-range plans. This is a 
quite simple observation, but provides reason to reflect carefully on planning and 
implementation. In the first paper’s case studies of Boston and Miami, appearing in 
the MPO plan had a limited connection to implementation. Rather, processes outside 
of MPO planning, bypasses, determined transit investment decisions, and in turn MPO 
plan content. In my New Starts analysis, many of the applicant projects failed to reach 
grant agreements. As a result, many projects failed to be implemented. Project 
sponsors must identify projects through, or at least after, a systems planning process; 
projects are in MPO long-range plans. In the case studies of transit implementation in 
Orlando and Miami, only some projects from long-range plans became poised for 
implementation. Despite the fiscal constraint requirements for MPOs, their plans 
might actually not be financially realistic, because funding shortfalls triggered some 
implementation failures. 
Second, though simple to note, significant action does not come easily. Rather, 
implementation requires substantial capacity to overcome highly varied obstacles. For 
example, the Green Line extension faced state inaction, while SunRail had a unique 
need for legislative approval of its liability agreement. The AirportLink emerged as an 
option from earlier visions of a much longer rail line. Different projects thus faced 
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different challenges in a world of limited resources. Sponsors for each project had to 
navigate slightly different terrain and draw upon diverse capacities. At any point, 
funding partnerships are fragile. For example, after a change in Orange County’s 
elected officials and continued business opposition, the funding agreement for light-
rail collapsed. 
Government appears critical for significant action. In the case studies, the 
critical decision making sites and lead actors were established government entities, the 
county and state in the case studies of papers one and two. MPOs are official 
quasigovernmental entities, operating through cooperation. They lack the status and 
capacity of formal government units where determinative action happened. It is 
important to note these formal governmental units wield direct power over substantial 
sums of money; the control of funds matters. 
Government entities mobilized capacity in response to business and civic 
sector actors, as well as economic priorities. Even as formal government entities were 
lead actors for developing capacity, their actions responded to private sector 
mobilization and political will. If financial commitment is a proxy for local political 
will behind projects, the quantitative analysis of NS projects shows it as highly 
uneven. Boston’s community-based organizations have relatively high capacity and 
pushed the state to implement two projects. They also could leverage a legal 
commitment, linked to a massive highway project. In Miami, the North Corridor 
project is important to black community leaders, but not as key issue for mobilization. 
In Orlando, the minority leaders who I was able to identify, did not specify transit 
investment as a top issue. The rail spur to the Miami International Airport has not 
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required much mobilization but enjoys a broad consensus of support. The amount of 
local political will behind SunRail is exceptional. Local political will can thus be 
broadly distributed but at a low level (such as AirportLink) or highly mobilized by 
specific groups, like neighborhood organizations in Boston. Stakeholders can, of 
course, mobilize in opposition to implementation, such as the business efforts against 
the I-Drive project in Orlando. 
Funds available for transit are neither fixed nor unlimited. Politicians and 
agencies can seek new funding sources, but new sources do not provide unlimited 
revenue. Perhaps this partly explains why local political will matters—projects and 
initiatives require funds. Without some political will or intense mobilization, 
government entities may not be able to raise or secure necessary funds. Funding one 
project can deplete resources available for another, unless there is new or abundant 
revenue. This is a tangible way that supporters of one initiative can exert ―power over‖ 
supporters of a different project. Funds for the first project may deplete enough 
resources such that there are not funds left for the second. Governance frameworks 
have not accounted for this interrelationship—how capacity mobilized for one 
intervention can make implementing another more challenging. 
Government responsiveness to private actors makes focus on governance 
understandable, but still incomplete. Findings show the need for further development 
of governance as an analytic category. Normative assumptions about governance—
that stakeholders should unite to actualize more in horizontal collaboration—have 
meant inattention to unequal influence and the continuing role for existing government 
forms. A more critical approach questions how capacity coalesces and for what, as 
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well as how power affects cooperative relationships. Transit and plan implementation 
more broadly can be an area for developing a more complex view of capacity building, 
including analysis of relationships across government levels, as I discuss next. 
What Is the Role of State and Federal Governments in Metropolitan Action? 
Horizontal partnerships were insufficient for transit implementation in my 
analysis. Instead, in the case studies of papers one and two, state and federal funds 
enabled implementation. SunRail relies heavily on state and federal sources, while 
AirportLink, in Miami, is a rare project that uses only local and state money. The 
Boston projects also rely on multiple sources of funding, and projects in the NS 
pipeline (paper 3) sought federal funds. The Houston Astrodome Line, discussed as a 
NS case profile, was a rare example of an entirely locally funded project, but the 
transit agency still is seeking federal funds for other rail lines. 
Certainly the federal level is powerful, but federal actors had limited avenues 
for action. Federal funding enabled many projects, but federal agencies neither 
proposed nor implemented any of the projects discussed. Through its New Starts 
program, the Federal Transit Administration can opt to reach a full funding grant 
agreement (or not) for proposed projects. Its assessments of benefits create a minimum 
threshold and may structure local decision making in ways I did not study.
22
 Yet, I 
found that FTA funding agreements most strongly correlate with local financial 
commitment, something that the federal agency has little to no control over. At the 
same time, federal actors can affect local actions through unexpected connections, as 
when the U.S. DOT Secretary implied HSR funds for Florida were contingent on 
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state-level support for intrametropolitan transit. Furthermore, the promise of federal 
funds stifled potential debate on SunRail, as Orlando actors sought regional unity.  
Like federal-level actors, state-level actors helped fund projects but used more 
channels of action. State agencies, like federal agencies, sometimes simply provide 
transit capital funds. This was not sufficient for implementation of the I-Drive LRT in 
Orlando or the North Corridor in Miami. States also take more direct roles, such as the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Big Dig transit investments. The Commonwealth is 
funding a significant portion of the Fairmount project and is responsible for 
implementing and funding the Green Line extension. In all of the Massachusetts 
examples, the state is responding to political mobilization and/or legal obligations—in 
this way the state is a useful arena for action. In Orlando, FDOT is sponsoring the 
SunRail project, from the track purchase to its first seven years of operations. In 
Florida, the state took a more active role for projects with economic significance and 
consensus. In turn, state support strengthened the feasibility of and consensus behind 
projects. States are the ―direct sovereign‖ of cities (Johnson, 2006), other local 
government entities, and quasigovernmental authorities. States can be funders, 
partners, initiators and implementers. 
The importance of state and federal actors for implementation demonstrates the 
need for NR analysis to go beyond the horizontal, intrametropolitan arena. Altshuler 
and Luberoff (2003) use the concept ―bottom-up federalism‖ to describe the 
relationship between local leaders and the federal government. In exploring highway, 
transit, and airport mega-projects during the mid-20
th
 century, Altshuler and Luberoff 
                                                                                                                                            
22
 See GAO, 2005, pp. 28-29 for survey findings that indicate federal funding availability is a top factor 
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conclude that the related federal funding programs ―were all distinguished more by 
their openness to local initiative than by their sharp definition of national purpose‖ 
(p.234). Local leaders ―took the lead at every stage. And while sensitive to federal 
program rules‖ (p.236), locals could seek congressional override of rules. Meanwhile, 
grantees, as a whole, could influence federal funding program design and related 
legislation.  
Altshuler and Luberoff may overstate the case, since the landscape of interests 
and aims is shaped also by the state and ongoing policy, economic, and political 
conditions. Furthermore, ―bottom-up‖ frequently has normative connotations as 
desirable and more authentic. At times, it is associated with grassroots leadership or at 
least local legitimacy. My research provides some examples of grassroots action, but 
implementation still often hinges on action by powerful actors that hardly seem to be 
the ―bottom.‖ The ―bottom‖ might be the state. Regardless, if interpreting the 
preceding papers through the lens of bottom-up federalism, the region does not appear 
as a critical actor in intergovernmental action. Perhaps this is because the region lacks 
the substantial governmental powers of the city, county, and state, despite federal 
mandates for regional transportation planning and MPOs. 
The New Starts program provides a tangible example of bottom-up federalism. 
Sub-national sponsors, like state DOTs, transit agencies, and counties, propose 
projects. The federal agency evaluates these projects and has a minimum threshold 
which proposed projects meet. The ultimate pattern of funding agreements, however, 
most correlates with local financial commitment.  
                                                                                                                                            
in transit agency decision making. 
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Bottom-up federalism describes relationships during a particular historic 
period in the United States. It is not the only possible model of decision making and 
connections across government levels. In fact, the role of the federal government and 
its relationship to states and cities changes over time, as Johnson (2006) describes. 
The ―cooperative federalism‖ that emerged in the 20th century marked an increase in 
federal intervention and replaced an era of more distinct state sovereignty, according 
to Johnson.  
Nonetheless, the concept of bottom-up federalism can provide a useful entry 
point into meso-theory about the multiple levels of government in implementation. It 
emphasizes the federal role, while also identifying the local initiative that steers 
investment. One risk of the bottom-up concept is its potential to direct attention away 
from existing federal policies that have dramatically shaped regional development, 
local incentives, and the landscape for action. That is why I specify its utility for 
implementation analysis. State and local agencies take a different role than the federal 
government, but the latter still wields tremendous power. In my deployment of ―power 
to‖ and ―power over,‖ I suggest a complex role for state actors. These dual concepts of 
power might be useful for analysis within regions and across more levels of 
government. Future research could further develop the mechanisms of bottom-up 
federalism and identify how federal transportation and other policies shape the 
landscape in which locals (or states) initiate, identify, and advance projects.  
Due to this central role for sub-national action, the focus on horizontal 
cooperation in the NR literature and practice is understandable, but overlooks federal 
and state-level actors. Within political economic context and with incentives and 
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priorities set by governing arrangements, local actors leverage and lead 
implementation. Without their action, federal agencies do not invest in transit 
infrastructure, but local implementation often depends on federal funds. States control 
the arrangement of cities, counties, MPOs, and transit agencies; they sometimes even 
lead infrastructure investments. The state legislature also has power over revenue 
options (Frug & Barron, 2008). Thus, models for action and analysis of investments 
are incomplete without attention to the state and federal roles. Furthermore, the region 
rarely appeared as a critical scale in my study of implementation.  
How Does Equity Fare in Implementation? 
As discussed in the introduction, there are multiple concepts of equity in 
transportation (Taylor & Tasiello Norton, 2009) and a myriad of measures for each 
concept. I adopt an opportunity equity perspective—that investments should be 
proportional across groups and communities. Because of my implementation focus, I 
consider if actualized infrastructure investments, among those proposed, include those 
that especially benefit low-income and minority populations. In implementation, it 
appears equity does not receive the level of investment suggested by new 
regionalism’s vision of integrated equity, environment, and economy. The neglect of 
equity in implementation is not due to active obstruction of investment in low-income 
and minority communities. Rather, in a fragmented world of limited resources, actors 
and resources often coalesce around other priorities and projects and therefore deplete 
funds and crowd out other possibilities. This is how mobilizing ―power to‖ becomes 
―power over.‖  
My first paper directly addresses equitable implementation. In the two case 
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study regions, MPO planning is not what determines transit implementation. Thus, I 
suggest federal directives on equity in planning will not be enough to affect MPO 
plans, let alone equitable implementation. Investments for low-income or minority 
communities depended on the action of elected officials and community advocates. In 
Boston, advocates leveraged a legal agreement for the Green Line and used the state 
legislature to fund a moderately priced commuter rail project. In Miami, some efforts 
to advance a promised line were part of a sales tax campaign plan. However, 
prioritizing this project in one document was insufficient for the project to advance.  
The structure of federal support for transit investments has mixed implications 
for equity. Bottom-up federalism requires sustained and high capacity at the local, 
regional or state level. Growth machine theory suggests that elected officials, business 
leaders and institutions will share an interest in growth, and thus growth will be the 
agenda upon which they act. If indeed action requires extensive mobilization, these 
powerful actors may be likely to emphasize economic growth functions. With 
powerful actors pursuing other goals, transit equity may not fare well in 
implementation.  
State agencies and legislatures were important arenas of recourse for equity 
groups in Massachusetts. In Boston, advocates tried to use federal planning 
requirements to advance equity, but found the MPO’s changes insufficient. Soon 
thereafter, however, CBOs pushed the state legislature for the Fairmount project’s 
funding. Across the political spectrum, interviewees mentioned the Fairmount project 
as desirable due to equity issues. Perhaps the controversy over the MPO changed the 
terms of debate. Still, the Fairmount project is relatively modest, especially without 
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increased service frequency. The implementation of the Green Line extension 
depended on a state-level agreement, but the agreement was spurred by a state 
agency’s knowledge that an environmental group could use federal provisions to sue. 
In their St. Louis case study, Swanstrom and Banks (2009) identified the state DOT as 
critical in the pursuit of community benefits agreements. However, the state may offer 
more or less fertile ground, depending on rural/metropolitan dynamics and the 
political leanings of state legislatures. Nonetheless, the state, with multiple channels of 
action and as a direct sovereign (Johnson, 2006), is a powerful arena, perhaps with 
more structures for democratic accountability than governance forums. 
The success of some community groups is encouraging for equity advocates, 
but the process of implementation is still likely to disadvantage equity concerns and 
investments. Community development activists assert the need to see assets—not just 
needs—in urban communities. Like the community benefits agreements that 
Swanstrom and Banks (2009) discuss, however, the ability to advance investments 
may require extraordinary capacity. Even if extraordinary capacity exists, transit 
infrastructure may not be the most critical campaign among the myriad of issues in 
low-income and minority communities. The federal limit on operating subsidies for 
large metropolitan areas means that federal funds are not aiding systems precisely 
where transit benefits and needs may be greatest. Increased transit operating funds and 
more modest improvements in bus speed and service levels may bring more benefits 
in the near term. The risk of this latter emphasis, however, is a continuation of a 
bifurcated transit system. 
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Implications for Policy and Practice 
Arguments for metropolitan planning organizations and unified regional 
transportation planning are compelling. Residents cross over jurisdictional lines again 
and again in their daily travels across metropolitan areas. Municipal jurisdictions alone 
cannot effectively address transportation woes, nor can separate agencies that deliver 
only one mode of the transportation system. Intermodal planning that combines 
automobile, transit, and active modes of travel can more effectively connect these 
systems. In addition, a centralized and meaningful metropolitan arena could provide a 
clearer site for civic engagement. More unified planning should eliminate actions at 
cross purposes: for instance the adoption of policies to reduce vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) while other actors invest in ways that encourage increased VMT. MPOs are 
often associated with a modal paradigm that differs from the ―predict and provide‖ 
model of roadway expansion that powerful state departments of transportation have 
often adopted. The rationale for regional transportation planning, however, is likely 
stronger than its actual role, due to metropolitan conditions and the current division of 
governmental powers. 
Given the complex landscape of agencies with separate processes and funds, 
what contributions can regions expect from MPO planning? Some literature on the 
evaluation of plan implementation considers whether plan makers follow the policies 
and obtain the outcomes that plans describe (―conformance‖) (Laurian et al., 2004). 
Alternatively, implementation evaluation can assess if plans are useful frameworks for 
decisions and spark dialogue (―performance‖) (Laurian et al., 2004). Transportation 
planning may differ from other types of planning. Even if plans express regional 
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visions and goals, a main focus is project selection. Regardless, findings from the 
bypassing equity chapter suggest that the planning process is not the site of decision 
making. If regional planning is not the site of decision making, can it then even align 
with the performance criterion of plans being used in later decision making? Further 
research could more systematically and quantitatively assess what share of projects or 
policies, from fiscally constrained plans, are implemented. This would further 
strengthen the field of planning’s knowledge of what MPO planning does or does not 
do. Further research could also consider a ―performance‖ evaluation—are these plans 
used to guide decisions? Likely, many MPOs make significant contributions even if 
implementation is partial or other decision sites more critical. For example, federal 
MPO directives on equity may have shifted the parameters of debate, without yet 
directly translating into dramatically different investment patterns. Some MPOs have 
probably shifted the parameters for decision making in ways this research did not 
uncover.  
Findings do suggest a need to rethink expectations and roles for MPOs. 
Regionalists have identified MPOs as a potential model for federally encouraged 
regionalism (Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, 2004). Previous research (Goldman & 
Deakin, 2000; Goldman, 2007) and my findings, however, show MPOs plan in an 
environment with durable government structures that blunt their influence. The 
particular configurations of institutional powers and responsibilities vary, but MPOs 
across contexts are subject to decisions that other agencies make on how to use funds. 
Plans must reflect other decisions made in consultation with, but not truly hinging on 
the regional forum. According to one interviewee quoted in my first paper, the model 
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supports the ―illusion of choice.‖ Reflecting the importance of transportation on the 
regional level, policy makers could strengthen the role of MPOs or identify other 
means for MPOs to contribute within the current landscape of governmental 
responsibilities. 
A number of actions could strengthen metropolitan planning organizations or 
increase their accountability. At the federal level, the DOT could funnel more funds 
directly to MPOs and give them more latitude to flex funds across categories. The 
National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission recommended 
(2007) something like this, a metropolitan mobility program with an 80 percent 
federal match. The report identifies MPOs as one among several possible homes for 
these metropolitan mobility funds. Sciara and Wachs (2007) present several examples 
of local revenue that MPOs control, but caution the capacities of and contexts for 
MPOs vary tremendously. Presumably, more funds would mean the regional forum 
had more power. Federal agencies could pressure MPOs to leverage their powers over 
area agencies. In fact, the FTA is investigating the San Francisco Bay Area’s MPO. 
An area transit provider, who receives federal funds through the MPO, has not done 
due diligence on Title VI. The FTA may hold the MPO accountable. The GAO (2009) 
suggests performance measures for MPOs. Their proposed measures, however, reflect 
neither that MPOs are not plan implementers or the influence of land use on 
transportation system outcomes.  
State actions could also empower MPOs. Such changes may be unlikely, as 
they might shift power away from the state. State DOTs should devolve more 
decisions and funds to metropolitan planning organizations, according to Katz, 
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Puentes & Bernstein (2005). States with existing growth management controls could 
give MPOs a role in growth management and land use. States could reorganize 
transportation agencies into centralized, multimodal metropolitan agencies responsible 
for planning, implementation, and operations. In fact, two interviewees in Miami-
Dade County suggested a consolidated, multimodal and function county transportation 
agency, with the expressway authority as the umbrella organization. Regardless, 
without dramatic changes, MPOs will still be subject to the funding decisions of 
established transit, state, county, and federal agencies.  
Alternatively, MPOs could redirect their efforts away from the rational 
planning process, the model for their planning. Currently MPOs do conduct a variety 
of activities; many have expanded beyond regional transportation planning (GAO, 
2009). But, their authorizing purpose and federal requirements place them in an 
uncomfortable place between visions and actual decision making. Instead MPOs could 
focus more on the visioning of possible futures and the mechanisms—infrastructure 
investments and policies—that would enable such visions. In fact, this has to some 
extent been the role of Boston’s Metropolitan Area Planning Commission (not the 
area’s MPO). The planning commission has taken policy positions and occasionally, 
opposed infrastructure investments. The risk with this model may be transportation 
infrastructure programs that are too disconnected from fiscal reality. In such visioning 
roles, however, MPOs could make the potential trade-offs and outcomes from 
different choices starker. Another option is for MPOs to serve as a clearinghouse of 
information on other transportation agency plans. Finally, rather than seeking public 
participation in its processes, MPOs could educate citizens about the multiple arenas 
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for transportation—and other—regionally significant decisions. They could measure 
public participation success by how the MPO supports citizen involvement in 
infrastructure decisions made elsewhere.  
Federal change related to funding programs may have a more tangible effect 
on transit investment patterns—and perhaps transportation outcomes—than changes in 
MPO requirements. Even as actual project outcomes hinge on local financial 
commitment, federal criteria screen out projects in the NS pipeline. The FTA’s land 
use assessment for NS could be more strenuous. Furthermore, Congress and the FTA 
could shift the program’s structure to advantage projects that maximize federal goals, 
rather than projects with local funds that sufficiently meet criteria. For transit equity, 
allowing significant federal support for transit operations in large metropolitan areas 
would support these critical systems that advance national goals cost-effectively. 
Making an Ideal Deal 
What should regional actors seek out of transit infrastructure investment? What 
is the ideal deal? The ideal rail deal, of course, depends on the perspective of the actor. 
Various incentives encourage infrastructure expansion, making any deal seem ideal for 
some. Capital projects provide political cache for elected officials in the forms of 
ribbon cutting (Taylor, 2004) and promises of jobs (Taylor & Samples, 2002). As a 
result, politicians from opposing parties may unite around capital investment, as in the 
Orlando case. Growth machine dynamics lead civic leaders to support public 
investment to encourage growth. With most transit projects receiving substantial funds 
from the federal and/or the state level, capital projects also represent largesse from 
above. Transit, in general, enjoys broad political support that can include 
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environmentalists, advocates for the poor (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003), and planners. 
Transit’s broad support and the desirability of local infrastructure investment can offer 
leverage for other critical interventions that would increase the likelihood of reaching 
regional goals. 
 From the perspective of the public interest, taken to be the objectives 
articulated in regional plans, the ideal deal for new transit infrastructure is difficult to 
define. The projects that seem most feasible for political or technical reasons may not 
be the most suited to promote equity, environmental, and even economic goals. 
Research suggests that rail investment has transformative effects only under some 
conditions (Giuliano & Agrawal, forthcoming). On the other hand, the long-term 
benefits could typically take more time than evaluations have allowed. Regardless, rail 
investments can be very costly, and the public sector should critically assess if a 
project is best suited for public goals, identified through democratic processes and 
planning. Supporting the wrong investments may be counterproductive. At the same 
time, even less than ideal infrastructure may launch later actions or broaden transit’s 
political support base in ways that enable more transformation in the long-term.  
The political support that can coalesce around infrastructure investment is an 
opportunity to make deals more ideal for advancing regional plan goals for 
sustainability. When projects have support across parties and jurisdictions, 
sustainability advocates can push for meaningful policy, land use, and financing 
changes. The Federal Transit Administration has laid groundwork for this, by 
considering land use in its evaluation of project benefits. For example, in one of the 
profiled cases in paper three, federal ratings increased after the City of Norfolk 
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adopted a new parking policy. Earlier in the decision making process, planners could 
identify the accompanying policies and land use controls that are essential to 
maximizing the benefits of rail investment. Making policy changes binding or required 
for funds is more likely to make them stick, and infrastructure investment might make 
such policies more politically palatable. There is likely more opportunity for such 
leverage where expansion is most extensive—places like Denver, Houston and Salt 
Lake City—but even the regions in papers one and two have ongoing investments. 
Other types of infrastructure investment, such as Boston’s Big Dig, may provide 
leverage for these policies as well. 
From an equity perspective, an ideal deal would include substantial investment 
in low-income and minority communities and/or new revenue for operating expenses. 
Thus, an ideal rail deal would also require leveraging political will behind 
infrastructure for other interventions. Leveraging political will for improved equity 
outcomes appears to require ongoing mobilization. For example, the 1990 Big Dig 
agreement provided enormous leverage, but the Green Line’s implementation still 
demanded extensive mobilization in the 2000s. The written prioritization of the North 
Corridor in Miami-Dade was insufficient for its implementation. Beyond capital 
investments, the ideal deal from an equity perspective might be tying expansion to 
operating funds increases, as operating funds are a critical issue for equity (Garrett & 
Taylor, 1999). At the federal level, the current enthusiasm for high-speed rail may be 
important leverage to push intrametropolitan multimodal funds and transit operating 
subsidies for large metros, where environmental and equity benefits may be greatest 
and come at lower public cost.
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Appendix I: Interviewee List 
 
Boston (all interviews by Lowe) 
Organization Interviewee 
A Better City (formerly Artery Business 
Committee) 
Rick Dimino 
ACE (fmr Four Corners) Lee Matsueda 
Action! Meira Soloff 
Boston MPO Pam Wolfe, Scott Peterson, Alicia 
Wilson & Liz Moore 
City of Boston-Transportation Vineet Gupta 
Conservation Law Foundation Carrie Russell 
Fairmount Collaborative                                         Joan Tighe/Mat Thall (telephone) 
Federal Highway Administration Michael Chong 
Government-fmr Confidential 
LISC  Kristin Blum 
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission Marc Draisen (Executive Director) 
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission Eric Bourassa (Transportation 
Manager) (telephone) 
MassDOT Scott Hamwey 
MBTA Advisory Board Paul Regan  
MBTA-Planning Joe Cosgrove 
MBTA-Service Planning Melissa Dullea 
Somerville Community Corp. Mary Regan & Meridith Levy 
Somerville Transportation Equity Partnership Elin Reisner 
Tufts Univ/ACE Penn Loh 
Washington Street Corridor Coalition Bob Terrell 
 
  Florida [Tallahassee] (all interviews by Lowe) 
 
Organization Name 
1000 Friends of Florida Charles Pattison (w/Magee) 
Department of Community Affairs Charles Gauthier 
FDOT-Central office Kathy Neill, Terry Kraft, 
Ed Coven, & Ed Hutchinson 
Florida chapter, APA Julia "Alex" Magee 
(w/Pattison) 
Florida League of Cities Rebecca O’Hara 
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Floridians for Better Transportation (FBT)  Douglas J. Callaway  
Office of [State] Senator Paula Dockery Rachel Perrin Rogers 
  Federal Highway Administration (Florida Office) Carl Mikyska, Carey Shepherd,    
Tamara  Christion,  LeeAnn Jacobs 
(telephone) 
  
 Miami 
 
Organization Name Interviewer 
Broward County-Planning Cathy Randazzo Gainsborough 
Broward MPO Chris Hesmati & 
Gregory Stuart 
Lowe 
Broward Planning Council Henry Sniezek Lowe 
Broward Workshop Kareen Boutros Gainsborough 
Catanese Center for Urban & Environmental 
Solutions; Florida Atlantic University 
Jim Murley Lowe 
Citizens Independent Transportation Trust Charles Scurr Gainsborough 
City of Miami-Planning Department  Harold Ruck Gainsborough 
Civic Confidential Lowe 
Collins Center for Public Policy  Phil Bacon  Lowe 
FDOT-District 4 Gerry O'Reilly and 
Lois Bush 
Gainsborough 
FDOT-District 6 Gary Donn and 
Brian Rick  
Lowe 
FIU Metropolitan Center Dario Moreno Lowe 
Government Confidential Lowe 
Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce Barry Johnson Gainsborough 
Hold the Line/Clean Water Action Dawn Sherrifs Lowe 
Human Services Coalition Daniella Levine Gainsborough 
Miami-Dade Aviation Sunil Harman Lowe 
Miami-Dade County Commission Commissioner 
Katy Sorenson 
(w/Jeremy Glazer, 
Legislative 
Analyst; Sean 
McCrackine, 
Environmental 
Legislative 
Analyst) 
Lowe 
Miami-Dade County Commission (fmr) Commissioner 
Betty Ferguson 
Lowe 
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Miami-Dade County-Department of Planning and 
Zoning 
Subrata Basu Gainsborough 
Miami-Dade Expressway Authority Javier Rodriguez Gainsborough 
Miami-Dade MPO Carlos Roa Lowe 
Miami-Dade Transit Harpal Kapoor & 
John Garcia  
Lowe 
MoveMiami Tony Garcia Lowe 
MPO [Miami-Dade] CTAC Barbara Walters Lowe 
Palm Beach County MPO Randy Whitfield Gainsborough 
Palm Beach County-Planning Lorenzo Aghemo Gainsborough 
Regional Business Alliance Ralph Marrinson Gainsborough 
South Florida Community Development Coalition Andrea Baker Lowe 
South Florida Planning Council Carolyn A. Dekle 
(plus staff) 
Lowe 
South Florida Regional Transportation Authority Joseph J. Quinty Lowe 
Transit provider Confidential  Lowe 
Transportation advocate Tom Boiton Lowe 
ULI Southeast Florida Carla Coleman Gainsborough 
University of Miami Peter Muller Lowe 
 
  Orlando 
Organization Name Interviewer 
Convention Center Authority Larry Henrichs Lowe 
Castle & Cooke (developers) John F. Rinehart Lowe 
City of Orlando Glenda Hood Lowe 
City of Orlando-Economic 
Development Christian Oleck  Gainsborough 
City of Orlando-Transportation 
Department Roger Neisender  Lowe 
Civic sector Confidential 3/09 A Lowe 
Congressman Mica Dick Harkey Lowe 
East Central Florida Regional 
Planning Council Philip Laurien Gainsborough 
FDOT-District V Gene Ferguson, John 
Moore & Jon Weiss 
Gainsborough 
Latino Leadership Marytza Sanz Lowe 
League of Women Voters  Lynn Eberly & Joanie 
Schrim 
Lowe 
LYNX Tony Walter Lowe 
LYNX Linda Watson Gainsborough 
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Metroplan (MPO) David Grovdahl  Lowe 
myregion.org Shelley Lauten Lowe 
New Covenant Baptist Church of 
Orlando, NAACP Reverend Bracy Lowe 
Office of [State] Senator Lee 
Constantine’s office Nathan Cook Lowe 
Orange County Linda Chapin (fmr mayor) Lowe 
Orange County confidential Lowe 
Orange County Commissioner Fernandez Gainsborough 
Orlando/Orange Expressway Michael Snyder Gainsborough 
Osceola County-Planning  Dave Tomek Gainsborough 
Rollins College Richard Foglesong Gainsborough 
Rollins College Bruce Stephenson Gainsborough 
Rosen Hotels Harris Rosen Lowe 
Seminole County-Planning Alison C. Stettner Gainsborough 
ULI Central Florida Mark Loeb Lowe 
Universal Studios John L. McReynolds  Lowe 
University of Central Florida James Wright & Jana 
Jasinski 
Lowe 
Voulsia County Commissioner Bruno  Gainsborough 
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Appendix II: Mann-Whitney U Scores 
*Indicates a Mann-Whitney U score significant at the .1 level and ** at the .05 level. 
 
Variable  Outcome N Test  
 
 
Significance 
score  
House appointments No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .214 
  Grant agreement 39     
Senate appointments No GA 17 Mann-Whitney U .404 
  Grant agreement 38     
Swing state status No GA 17 Mann-Whitney U .061* 
  Grant agreement 38     
Transit providers No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .346 
  Grant agreement 39     
MPOs No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .687 
  Grant agreement 39     
Share of commuters using 
transit 
No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .034** 
  Grant agreement 39     
UZA population No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .194 
  Grant agreement 39     
First justification rating No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .603 
  Grant agreement 39     
First financial rating No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .098* 
  Grant agreement 39     
Last justification rating No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .803 
  Grant agreement 39     
Last financial rating No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .000** 
  Grant agreement 39     
Capital cost (in millions) No GA 18 Mann-Whitney U .023** 
  Grant agreement 39     
New starts share of costs No GA 18 t test 
0.44 
  Grant agreement 39     
Cost/projected rider
 
 No GA 18 t test  .596 
 Grant agreement 39  
 
